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ABSTRACT
THE DIFFICULT DECISION TO DEVALUE A CURRENCY
BY
MENNA BIZUNEH
July 2012
Committee Chair: Dr. Neven T. Valev
Major Department: Economics
The switch from a fixed exchange rate regime to a flexible exchange rate regime
seldom goes smoothly. It usually disrupts financial markets, and produces steep
output recession and inflation. The 1997 devaluations in Indonesia, Malaysia, and
Thailand; the 1994 devaluation in Mexico; and the 2001 devaluation in Argentina
are only a few examples. In each of these cases output contracted by more than 10
percent and unemployment went into double digits. The economic disruption often
spreads throughout the region and globally. The IMF was established to prevent
and contain such crises but they seem to be a recurrent theme throughout the world.
A major reason why devaluations are so disruptive is that countries are reluctant
to abandon their fixed exchange rate regimes. The longer they have been on the
fixed exchange rate, the less likely they seem to become to switch to a flexible
exchange rate, irrespective of what is happening to the economy. The pressure on
the fixed exchange rate could mount for years, and yet countries refuse to devalue
until they have no choice. Devaluation without choice, however, shows that the
authorities have lost control. As a result, the financial markets panic, putting the
economy into a tailspin.
This “reluctance to devalue” phenomenon is one of the puzzles in international
finance. Yet, although it is observed regularly and has far reaching policy
implications, it has not been systematically explored by the literature. My
dissertation makes steps in that direction.
xi
In the first chapter I investigate the factors that may influence the probability of
a switch from a fixed to a flexible exchange rate regime using survival models. The
use of survival models allows us to test if a switch to flexible exchange rate regime is
dependent on the time spent on a fixed exchange rate regime. I use the
non-parametric Kaplan-Meier estimator and a proportional hazard Cox model to
show that exchange rate regimes, namely fixed exchange rate regimes, have
non-monotonic duration dependence. Moreover, I find that GDP growth strongly
influences the probability of abandoning a peg in favor of floating currency policy.
These results are robust even when possible country intra-correlation is accounted
for through marginal risk analysis. Based on the finding in chapter one, which
highlights that a decrease in GDP growth, namely recessions, increase the
probability of devaluation, the next two chapters provide possible explanations as to
why countries may be reluctant to abandon their pegs.
The second chapter proposes that the reluctance to devalue could stem from
uncertainty about the control over inflation after devaluation. In countries with
long-standing currency pegs as well as in countries where the fixed exchange rate
was preceded by high inflation, central banks have little credibility. The uncertainty
about the consequences of monetary policy raises the threshold of economic pain
that could convince policy makers to devalue. I develop this argument in a
rules-vs-discretion theoretical framework. Empirical analysis based on survey data
from Bulgaria supports this hypothesis.
However, abandoning a fixed exchange rate regime is one of the three options
that is available to countries on a peg. To this effect the last chapter investigates
whether a periphery country’s decision to abandon to keep its peg or to abandon it
is impacted by potential move to a currency board (a move from a peg to a peg). In
particular I examine whether the European Monetary Union (EMU) is viewed by
periphery countries as an insurance mechanism and how this view impacts their
xii
willingness to pursue Eurozone membership, focusing on Bulgaria. I find that there
is a perception that a member country will be bailed out by the EMU even if the
problems are not caused by the EMU. Also, the country can loosen its fiscal
discipline if it is in the Eurozone, expecting a bailout if it has problems paying back
debts as confirmed by recent financial assistance extended to Greece by EU
governments, European Central Bank (ECB), and the IMF. This is pure moral
hazard and an expected but undesirable consequence of the Greek bailout. These
perceptions strengthen significantly the support for pursuing EMU membership.
Although a large fraction of Bulgarians expect a negative impact of the euro on the
Bulgarian economy and on themselves they still support adopting the euro because
of its safety mechanism.
There are three main lessons to be taken from this dissertation. First, societies
prefer status quos vis− a`− vis currency policy. This is especially true, if the status
quo is attained after a negative experience with a different previous currency policy.
Second, society’s view assessment of the benefits and costs currency policy doesn’t
always reflect the cost and benefits calculated by economists. Furthermore, the
cost-benefit analysis for currency policy options change as citizens adapt their
expectations based on sustained or violated rules associated with a currency policy
(i.e. the violation of Maastich Treaty in providing bailouts to Greece). Third, the
credibility of the institutions that administer the currency policy is as equally
important as the currency policy itself. Therefore, in trying to understand the
“reluctance to devalue” phenomenon that is observed populations’ expectations play
a significant role.
xiii
Chapter I
ARE WE FLOATING YET? DURATION OF FIXED EXCHANGE
RATE REGIMES
I.1 Introduction
The frequency of currency crises in the past decade has brought renewed interest in
the issue of optimal exchange rate policy. This interest was further fueled recently
as we watch pegged economies (i.e. Estonia, Latvia, and Bulgaria) face the decision
to abandon their fixed exchange rate regimes or face a severe recession during the
current global financial crisis. Economists are particularly interested in the nature
of these exits and their macroeconomic, financial and institutional determinants.
In this paper we argue that time is an important concept for the analysis of
transition between exchange rate regimes. In particular, we argue that the
probability of an exit from a particular exchange rate regime is likely to be
determined by the time spent within a given regime. To this effect, we study the
conditional probability of a particular exchange rate regime ending by adopting a
duration model for various countries. The duration of a given exchange rate regime
is important in assessing currency stability. Exchange rate credibility depends not
only on the reaction to speculative attacks, but also on the time already spent in a
regime for which a particular currency does not suffer from a speculative attack.
Furthermore, we explicitly account for intra-correlation within countries’ choice of
1
2exchange rate regime through marginal risk analysis, using the Andersen and Gill
(1982) and Wei et al. (1989) models.
The choice of exchange rate regimes is extensively explored in the international
finance literature. The determinants of which types of exchange rate regimes should
be implemented depending on a countrys characteristics have been theoretically
predicted (see Mundell (1961), McKinnon (1963), Rizzo (1998), Frankel (1999),
Fischer (2001), Poirson (2001), Juhn and Mauro (2002), VonHagen and Zhou (2007),
Carmignania et al. (2008)). The determinants of the choice of currency policy are
argued from several perspectives including optimal currency areas, currency crises,
and policy credibility. However, the existing literature could not identify a single
generalizable variable as an unquestionable determinant of exchange rate choice.
Empirical studies which aim to uncover the determinants of exits from one
exchange rate regime to another seem to also be plagued with the problem of not
having a single generalizable determinant of the choice of exchange rate regime,
instead these studies provide varying results for the determinants of choice of
exchange rate regimes depending on the definitions of an exchange rate regime
classification, the definition of exit from an exchange rate regime, the time periods
covered, the sample of countries used, the econometric methodology, and
explanatory variables utilized.
Most of the empirical studies undertaken in the estimation of the determinants
of exchange rate regime choice so far have been of the probit and logit nature
(Kumar et al. (1998), Eichengreen et al. (1995), Klein and Marion (1994), Masson
and Ruge-Murcia (2003)). As such, they are unable to account for the time
dependence that may be present in the decision to abandon a fixed exchange rate
regime in favor of a flexible exchange rate regime. Ideally, the empirical model to be
used in the estimation of the determinants of exchange rate regime choice should
take into consideration two conditions: the possibility of non-monotonic
3time-dependence and the effect of intra-correlation. First, the probability regime
switch depends on economic and institutional characteristics as well as time spent in
a particular exchange rate regime. Moreover, the time-dependence may be
non-monotonic resulting in a probability of exit from an exchange rate regime which
increases during short duration but increases for longer duration.
A possible source of correlated failure times of the same event type are familial
studies, in which each family member is at risk of developing a disease of interest.
Failure times of family members are correlated because they share genetic and
perhaps environmental factors.
Another source of correlated failure times of the same type are studies where the
same event can occur on the same individual multiple times.
Second when analyzing multiple exit (failure) times of the same time there is a
potential for a lack of independence of the failure times. These correlated exits
times from a particular exchange rate regime could set the platform for contagious
effect regional or through closely linked economies (i.e. industrial economies). There
have been several studies that argue that currency crises can be transmitted
between countries, especially through the mechanism of trade (Eichengreen et al.
1995). The empirical studies that tried to address the duration dependence that
could affect the choice of exchange rate regimes are limited (Setzer 2004), (Tudela
2004), (Walti 2005). None of the empirical studies provide a comprehensive analysis
for different types of economies (i.e. industrial, emerging, developing) using de facto
exchange rate regimes.
This paper contributes to the literature by expanding on the works of Tudela
(2004) and Walti (2005) in four ways. First, the paper analyzes the duration
dependence of exits from a fixed exchange rate regime and whether there exits are
non-monotonically dependent on time. Second, the paper utilizes Reinhart and
Rogoff (2004)’s de facto classification of exchange rate regime following Walti
4(2005). Third, Tudela (2004) and Walti (2005) both focus on a subset of countries
and monthly or quarterly data. Using high frequency data creates more exchange
rate regime switches (observations), however does not correspond with the long-run
behavior of exchange rate choice. In the same token, having a larger sample of
countries provides broad evidence base about how countries choose their exchange
rate systems. Therefore we use a data set that has a more comprehensive list of
countries and a longer period (annual) of observation. And finally, the paper
addresses the possibility of the decision to abandon a peg being intra-correlated
through the use of marginal analysis. To our knowledge, no such empirical work has
been carried out.
Our results reveal that the probability of an exit from a fixed exchange rate
regime is non-monotonically time-dependent. To control for country-specific
heterogeneity, we include time-varying covariates in the Cox proportional hazard
model. The findings from the semi-parametric approach suggest that some factors,
such as GDP growth, could affect the probability of a switch from fixed to flexible
exchange rate regimes. These findings are confirmed through the marginal risk
analysis.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the
empirical model, while section 3 presents the data. Then section 4 presents
empirical results and in section 5 we provide concluding remarks.
I.2 Econometric Methodology
Let T be a nonnegative variable which represents the length of time a country
spends in a certain type of exchange rate regime, or the duration (spell) of that
exchange rate regime. In our study T represents the time during which a country is
in a fixed exchange rate regime until the exit to a floating exchange rate regime.
5The random variable T can be described through its cumulative distribution
function given by
F (s) =
∫
f(s)ds = Pr(T ≤ t), (1)
where the probability density function, f(t), represents the probability that an
exchange rate regime will survive less than some given value t.
The survival function, which describes the probability that the regime will last t
periods or longer, is given by
S(t) = 1− F (t) = Pr(T > t) (2)
for t = 0, S(t) = 1 and for t =∞, S(t) = 0.
Duration analysis focuses on conditional probabilities. To this effect the hazard
function becomes a central concept. The hazard function determines the
instantaneous probability that an exit from a particular exchange rate regime will
occur in t+ ∆t, given the exchange rate regime has survived up to time t. Thus the
hazard function 1 is defined as
λ(t) = lim
∆t→0
Pr(t ≤ T ≤ t+ ∆t)
∆t
=
f(t)
S(t)
. (3)
The estimation of the hazard function requires some assumptions about the
duration pattern. If such assumptions cannot be made the non-parametric approach
of Kaplan-Meier estimation allows for a preliminary analysis of duration
dependence. The graphed hazard function by the Kaplan-Meier estimator affords us
the opportunity to test whether time already spent in a fixed exchange rate regime
has an independent effect on the likelihood of an exit into a flexible exchange rate
1The hazard function, sometimes known as the hazard rate, contains the same information as
the probability density function but duration dependence is easily interpreted based on the shape
of the hazard function.
6regime beyond the control of time-varying variables. However, the non-parametric
Kaplan-Meier estimator does not allow the inclusion of constant or time-varying
explanatory variables.
To incorporate time-varying covariates, the Cox (1972) approach of proportional
hazard is used to specify the duration model. This semi-parametric method requires
less than complete distributional specification of the base-line hazard. Given the
lack of theory regarding the duration of fixed exchange rate regimes, the
proportional hazard model seems a reasonable compromise between the
non-parametric approach of Kaplan-Meier estimator, which does not allow for
various explanatory factors, and the possibly wrongly specified parametric approach.
The Cox proportional hazard model assumes that covariates shift the baseline
hazard multiplicatively. As such in a continuous time and with time-varying
covariates it is introduced in the following functional form:
λ(t, x(t), β) = λ0(t)φ(x(t), β), (4)
where λ0(t) is the baseline hazard, φ(x(t), β) is a function of x(t), which are
time-varying regressors, and a vector of unknown coefficients β. In a
semi-parametric model the baseline hazard λ0(t) has an unspecified functional form
and represents the case where x(t) = 0. In other words, the baseline hazard provides
the hazard function for a mean country and information about duration
dependence. The explanatory variables found in x(t) shift the hazard function for
different countries with given length of time spent in a given exchange rate regime
by multiplying the baseline hazard.
The most common choice of φ(x(t), β) is the exponential form
φ(x(t), β) = exp(x′(t)β), (5)
7ensuring that φ(x(t), β) > 0 and allowing coefficient to be easily interpreted.
In this paper, the duration of countries on fixed exchange rate regimes is
measured in terms of years. But the exact time in the year is not given. In such a
case the transitions from a fixed exchange rate regime to a non-fixed exchange rate
regime is said to be grouped. Discrete-time proportional hazard models handle this
type of data better than continuous-time proportional hazard models. In
discrete-time proportional hazard model the regressors are constant within the
interval but can vary across intervals, while the baseline hazard,λ0(t), can vary
within the interval. In implementation the complementary log-log model is utilized.
The complementary log-log hazard function after some algebra becomes 2
h(t) = 1− exp(− exp(x′(t)β + γ(t))), (6)
where γ(t) = ln
∫ t+1
t
λ0(s)ds.
In order to estimate the unknown parameters β and γ(t), we have to express the
probabilities presented in the hazard function in terms of a likelihood function. The
log-likelihood for the contribution made by the ith country observation in the
interval tj is then given by
Li(θ) = di ln(hi(t)) +
tj−1∑
t=1
ln(1− hi(t)), (7)
Li(θ) = di ln(1− exp(exp(x′(t)β + γ(t))))−
tj−1∑
t=1
exp[x′(t)β + γ(t)], (8)
2
h(t) = 1− exp(− exp(x′(t)β)) ∗
∫ t+1
t
λ0(s)ds = 1− exp(−
∫ t+1
t
λ0(s)ds[exp(x
′(t)β)])
= 1− exp(− exp(ln(
∫ t+1
t
λ0(s)ds) + x
′(t)β)))
8where θ is the set of parameters to be estimated and di indicates whether the i
th
spell is censored or not3. If di = 1 the spell is uncensored- the transition from a
fixed exchange rate regime to a flexible exchange rate regime is observed- and if
di = 0 the i
th observation is censored, implying the transition is not observed.
Furthermore, we need to consider that our data consists of N countries each of
which has multiple-cycle data, where countries experience multiple transitions.
Hence, the a hazard function may depend upon the number of previous spells of
fixed exchange rate regime (occurrence dependence) as well as the lengths of
previous time spent in the fixed-exchange rate regime state (lagged duration
dependence). As such conducting an analysis of multiple transition data by just
examining time to first event, ignoring additional failures, is inadequate because it
wastes possibly relevant information. Thus, in order to incorporate multiple spells,
the partial likelihood framework needs to be utilized where the log-likelihood
function or a given country incorporates different transition intensities4. Let us
define dc = 1 if a fixed exchange rate regime is abandoned at the end of the c
th cycle
and 0 otherwise. Then, a country observed over Ci cycles will have the following
log-likelihood function:
Li(θ) =
Ci−1∑
c=1
[ln[hci(t
i
c, s
i
c, tj)] +
tj−1∑
c=1
ln[1− hci(tic, sic, t)]
+di ln[h
Ci(tCi , sCi)] +
tj−1∑
t=1
ln[1− hCi(tCi , sCi , t)], (9)
where the last cycle of each country may be right censored or result in an exit and
h(.) is given by Equation (6). Furthermore, the baseline rate in this estimation has
been defined through a set of dummy variables. This function, known as the
3A spell is censored when we do not observe the duration of the spell until its conclusion.
4Multiple spells occur when a country can fix the exchange rate for some time, then float, then
fix again according to our definition of fixed exchange rate regimes.
9piecewise constant(PWC) hazard model, is a proportional hazard model, which lets
the baseline hazard be a step function with k intervals, where the hazard is constant
in each interval, but may vary from one interval to the other.
While PWC model is one proportional hazard approach to conducting duration
analysis for multiple-cycle data, a major issue in extending the proportional hazard
models to multiple events per country is the intra-subject correlation(Therneau and
Grambsch 2000) . As previously stated, this problem can be sidestepped by only
taking time until first exit from a peg; however important information on the exit
process will be lost. When a given country may contribute multiple events, the
assumption of independent observations in the standard Cox model does not hold.
Marginal models offer flexibility in the formation of strata and risk sets, definition of
the time scale, and have a well-developed estimator of the variance.Lipsitz et al.
(1990) showed that marginal models can overcome this assumption for the
estimation of the variance of β by an appropriate correction based on a grouped
jackknife estimate5.
Another important issue in multiple events data is to distinguish between data
sets where the multiple events have a distinct ordering and those where they do not.
In the particular case of this study, the outcome of leaving a fixed exchange rate
regime is ordered. A country cannot have its second exit from a peg before its first.
To account for such ordered events with possibility of being correlated we utilize
two common approaches: the independent increments model (Andersen and Gill
1982), and marginal (Wei et al. 1989) model. Both are marginal regression models
in that the estimated βˆ is determined from a fit that ignores the correlation between
the events followed by a correction of the variance, but differ considerably in their
creation of the risk set.
5Although unbiased, this grouped-jackknife estimate is typically more variable than the ordinary
variance of the Cox model, but it is a robust variance that adequately addresses repeated event
correlation.
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The Andersen and Gill (1982) (AG)model is the simplest method, but it makes
the strongest assumptions. Each country is represented as a series of observations
with non-overlapping time intervals, where the end of time for each interval is
determined by an occurrence of an exit or change in any time-varying covariates.
The AG model makes the assumption that events are equal and thus treats them
independently. This allows the exit to be measured as time to first exit, time from
first exit to second exit and so on (Cleves 2002). Each country contributes to the
risk set for a specific time as long as they are under observations, as defined by
inclusion of the specified time in the country’s interval set6.
The AG model is a counting process approach. The difference between the AG
model and the standard Cox model can be seen through the definition of the hazard
function. The intensity process for subject i in the AG model is given by
h(t) = Yi(t)λ0(t) exp(Xi(t)β), (10)
where Yi(t) is the indicator function that country i is still under observation at time
t, λ0(t) is the baseline hazard, Xi denotes the covariate vector for country i, and β
is a vector of coefficients. In the standard Cox model, the individual country ceases
to be at risk when the event exit from a peg occurs and Yi(t) takes value zero, but
for AG model for recurrent events, Yi(t) remains one as exits occur until the last
time the exit is observed.
In the Wei et al. (1989) (WLW) model, the ordered outcome data set is treated
as if it were an unordered competing risk case. The number of strata in the analysis
will be equal to the maximum number of exits a country experiences in the time
period. Unlike the AG model, the WLW model allows for a separate underlying
6While the Andersen-Gill formulation has a number of advantages, including the ability to ac-
commodate left-censored data, time-varying covariates, multiple events, and discontinuous intervals
of risk, a major limitation of this approach is it doesn’t allow more than one event to occur at a
given time. Some of these practical advantages are discussed in an applied framework by Johnson
et al. (2004).
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hazard for each exit7. In the WLW model a country is at risk until the country exits
a peg or there is censoring. Hence, the hazard function for the jth event for country
i becomes
h(t) = Yij(t)λ0j(t) exp(Xi(t)βj). (11)
Yij(t), the at-risk indicator for the i
th country, is one until the occurrence of the jth
exit. If the jth exit occurs or if there is censoring then Yij(t) becomes zero,
indicating that the country is no longer at risk after the last given exit8.
We proceed in this paper in three steps. First, we estimate the hazard function
utilizing the non-parametric estimator which can illustrate the duration dependence
in graphical form. Second, we conduct semi-parametric analysis with time-varying
covariates to see if the patterns in duration dependence could be explained by
time-varying factors. In particular, using the Piecewise Constant (PWC)
proportional hazard framework allows us to estimate the unknown parameters
without specifying the form of the base-line hazard. Moreover, we can address the
possibility of occurrence dependence and duration dependence through time
dummies. And finally, we introduce marginal analysis to treat multiple events from
a country without violating the assumption that events per subject are independent.
Marginal models, namely the AG and WLW models, will be able to explicitly
account for intra-subject correlation by replacing the standard variance estimate
with one which is corrected for possible correlations.
7The AG and WLW models are the same in that we get a single set of covariates that are constant
across the event ranks.
8Metcalfe and Thompson (2007) have shown that the WLW model infringes on the proportional
hazards assumption when applied to multiple spells, maybe causing a bias. However, they have also
shown that such a a bias is not behind the distinctive effect estimates and also that the infringement
of the proportional hazards assumption is not necessarily greater than the experienced with other
applications of proportional hazards regression. As such we do not see a prohibition to the application
of the WLW method to the multiple spells data.
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I.3 Data
I.3.1 Classification of Exchange Rate Regime
The classification of exchange rate regimes has some variation in different studies.
The predominant number of the studies focuses on the official de jure exchange rate
regime classification retrieved from the IMFs Annual Report on Exchange
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, which is based on official declarations
made by national governments once a year (Klein and Marion 1994). The obvious
problem with this form of classification is that many countries which declare having
floating exchange rates are characterized by pegs and many announced pegged
regimes turn out to be a more flexible regime (Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995),Calvo
and Reinhart (2002)). On the other hand some studies have constructed their own
indicators to define exchange rate regime (Tudela 2004) , while other research uses
pure or hybrid de facto classification ( Reinhart and Rogoff (2004),Setzer
(2004),Levy-Yeyati and Struzenegger (2002),Duttagupta and Otker-Robe (2003)).
We use Reinhart and Rogoff (2004)’s annual de facto classification of exchange
rate regime and group exchange rate regimes into two categories: fixed regimes and
floating regimes. The constructed de facto classification is chosen for three main
reasons. First it avoids identifying short spells of exchange rate stability as regimes.
Unlike other de facto classifications which identify short-term spells of exchange
rate stability within a regime, Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) identify longer-term
regimes by considering a five-year horizon.
Second, it takes into account the fact that countries may have dual or multiple
exchange rates and/or parallel markets. Failing to look at market-determined rates
can lead to misleading perceptions about the underlying monetary policy and the
ability of the economy to adjust to shocks. This can results in an underlying
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inflationary monetary policy which may not be captured by the official exchange
rate.
Finally, the Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) de facto classification is not based on
official declaration but rather on the action of monetary authorities, avoiding a
possible discrepancy between officially reported exchange rate regimes and the
actual characterization of the exchange rate regimes in the countries. Previous
empirical studies on exchange rate regimes that relied on the classification available
from the Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions
published by the IMF were missing important information9.
I.3.2 Definition of Exits
Duration of a spell in this study is defined as the time that a currency is pegged.
We define an exit from a fixed to a flexible exchange rate regime as the shift from a
strict fixed category to announced pegs, crawling pegs, managed float or free
floating exchange rate regime10. The sample period extends from 1970 to 2007.
Each duration period corresponds to the number of years from the time of origin
until an exit. If a regime is still in place by the 2007 we register the observation as
being censored.
The Kaplan-Meier calculation of the hazard function makes use of the number of
regimes that are eligible to exit, and this number will capture the fact that these
regimes are not at risk of exiting a fixed exchange rate regime (since they all
survived) until they come under observations. The semi-parametric approach uses
only observation at times of exit. The simple fact that a regime is observed in 1970
means that it did not exit a fixed exchange rate regime before. This is true for all
regimes observe in 1970, so none of these regimes could have abandoned a peg
9For other de jure and de facto classifications see (Shambaugh 2004), (Bubula and Otker-Robe
2002), (Ghosh et al. 2002),and (Levy-Yeyati and Struzenegger 2002)
10We define an exit from a fixed exchange rate regime as a shift from categories 1 or 2 to categories
3 or 4 using Reinhart and Rogoff (2004)’s coarse grid.
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before that date. Hence, we would not have any observation to contribute to the
partial likelihood.
I.3.3 Time-Varying Variables
As determinants of the likelihood of exit from a peg, country-specific time-varying
variables are selected on the basis of empirical studies dealing with the determinants
of the optimal choice of exchange rate regimes. Macroeconomic variables include
inflation, economic growth, openness, current account balance, real exchange rate,
unemployment, and claims on government. Financial variables consist of net foreign
assets as ratio of GDP, international reserves and domestic credit. Finally, the
quality of institutions, proxied by an index of political rights, is added11. Table 1
presents the explanatory variables and their expected signs. The expected signs are
based on the findings of previous empirical studies using duration analysis. The
data assembled is annual data from 1970 through 2007 for 144 countries. The
database for most of the variable is the World Development Indicators published by
the World Bank, Polity IV data set, and External Wealth of Nations provided by
Philip Lane.
I.4 Empirical Results
Before explaining the result of our estimates, we have to report some of the
characteristics of the duration of the spells. Recall that a spell is defined as the time
that a particular country is in a fixed exchange rate regime. Information about the
duration of the pegs is provided in Table 2. We see that we have 4,942 years of pegs
(among all countries). Also we see that the number of years on a fixed exchange
11In order to avoid feed back effects of the occurrence of a switch from a peg into macroeconomic
variables,variables from year t are used to determine the probability of exit from the peg in year
t+ 1.
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rate regime is the highest in year 38 (23.07%), which reflects the right censoring of
the data.
Table 3 provides information on the exit rate from a fixed exchange rate regime
to a floating exchange rate regime. It is worth noting that about one third of the
spells in our sample end in the first 10 years of the peg. It should also be noted that
both Table 2 and Table 3 account for duration and exits where countries could have
multiple exits. In fact, Table 4 presents how many observations have multiple exits.
About 49 percent of our observations are right censored (meaning there is no exit
from the peg), while about 33 percent our observation experience only one exit from
a peg. The remaining 19 percent of our observation experience multiple exits from a
peg. These multiple exits reaffirm the existence of multiple-cycle in the data. In this
case, the hazard function may depend upon the number of previous entries to the
pegged state (occurrence dependence) or it may depend upon the lengths of previous
visits to the pegged state (lagged duration dependence).
I.4.1 Baseline Hazard Rate
Probability of exit from a fixed exchange rate regime to a floating exchange rate
regime can be graphically illustrated with the non-parametric Kaplan-Meier
estimator. Figure 1 presents the smoothed hazard estimate and the estimated
hazard function obtained with the Kaplan-Meier estimator. A clear non-monotonic
pattern of duration dependence appears. More precisely, it starts out increasing,
reaches a peak then starts decreasing. Duration dependence can not therefore be
qualified as positive nor negative, it depends upon survival time. What can explain
this non-monotonic shape? It could be that at the very beginning of the peg that
agents are not very confident in the peg. Then, as the peg goes on, conditional on
survival upto a certain threshold, the probability of an exit from the peg starts to
decline. Although, the duration dependence is not clearly linear, negative duration
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dependence exists after approximately 12 years on a fixed exchange rate regime,
showing that the probability of leaving the peg decreases with duration. The
integrated hazard function in Figure 2 confirms the evidence in favor of a
non-monotonic pattern of duration dependence. Moreover, the non-monotonic
relationship between time spent within a fixed exchange rate regime and the
probability of exit from a peg is illustrated through the estimated base-line hazard
in Figure 3.
However, hazard functions are affected by a variety of country-specific factors,
potentially varying over time. Consequently, it is desirable to control for such
factors directly. As such in the next section we conduct the estimation of the
proportional hazard model by means of partial likelihood.
I.4.2 Duration Dependence and Time-varying Covariates
The piecewise constant proportional hazard (PWC) model is constant at each
interval, but varies from one interval to the other. This method allows the
estimation of fully non-parametric specifications for the baseline hazard,
analogously to the Cox model. All intervals are assumed to be of unit length so the
recorded duration for each country i corresponds to the interval [ti − 1, ti) and
countries are recorded as either having left the pegged state during the interval, or
as still remaining in the pegged state. This methodology will allows us to observe if
the hazard function depends upon previous length of time spent in the pegged state,
duration dependence.
The interval-specific baseline hazard in PWC model can only be identified for
those intervals during which events occur. If there are duration intervals for which
this is not true, then the duration dimension needs to be grouped more or the
relevant country-year combinations must be dropped from the estimation. To this
effect we look at the number exits from a peg for each year under observation.
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Table 5 shows that there are no exits from a fixed exchange rate regime during years
1, 11, 25, 27, 32, 36, and 37. As such, a year-specific hazard rate cannot be
estimated for these intervals. We also observe that the exit rate from a fixed
exchange rate regime is the highest in the early years of the peg. About 27 percent
of the exits in our sample occur in the first four years of of the peg, and about 43
percent of the exits occur within the first 10 years. The non-parametric baseline
model is then estimated by including all the relevant duration dummies. Due to
these proportions we focus our estimates in the behavior of the base-line hazard for
the first 10 years since the beginning of the peg.
The results of the PWC model are reported in Table 6. The dependent variable
is the probability of leaving a fixed exchange rate regime for a non-fixed exchange
rate regime. The baseline hazard rate has been defined through a set of dummy
variables, one for each year until the fourth12. From the fifth until the tenth year it
has been defined with a dummy for every two years. Three more dummies are
introduced for the remaining years with bigger intervals13.
If the sign on the estimated parameters is negative we interpret it as a decline in
the probability of exit from a peg based on that variable. On the other hand if the
sign on the estimated parameter is positive then that implies that the probability of
exit from a peg increases with that variable. So the negative signs and the statistic
significance on the time dummy variables associated with year 4, the interval for
years 5 and 6, the interval for year 11 to 16, the interval for years 17 to 26, and the
interval for year 27 to 38 indicate that a decrease in the probability of exit from a
fixed exchange rate regime during those periods. Furthermore we plot the base-line
hazard for our estimated semi-parametric function in Figure 3. The base-line hazard
function shows a general downward slope. That is, the likelihood of exit into a a
12The first interval, yr1, is used as the reference level.
13The number of exits per year for years that there is an exit is relatively small. Some additional
grouping of duration intervals might therefore be considered desirable. Hence, we redefine the
baseline hazard through a more aggregate set of dummy variables, one for each 6 year period.
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floating exchange rate regime declines with the length of time spent under a peg.
Therefore, we can clearly state a negative duration dependence.
We also find that GDP Growth has a negative effect on the probability of
abandoning a peg and it is robustly significant. The negative sign of the estimated
parameter indicates that a decline in GDP growth leads to an increase in the
probability of ending the spell of fixed exchange rate regime. That is if growth is
declining there would be pressure to ease financial policies through currency
devaluation to stimulate activity, especially exports. This will increase the
probability of exit from a fixed exchange rate regime.
Inflation, measured as an annual percent change in CPI, is expected to have a
positive sign implying that high inflation increases the likelihood of exit from a fixed
exchange rate regime. In a country with a peg, higher inflation than partner
countries results in significant overvaluation of the real exchange rate. This in turn
can impact resources allocation, competitiveness, and macroeconomic stability
(Kumar et al. 1998), increasing the probability that a peg is abandoned. The
estimated coefficients for Inflation from the PWC proportional hazard model are
positive and non-significant.
As indicators of the health of the foreign sector we have included the variables
Current Account Balance and Openness. Both of these variables are expected to
have negative signs. A greater degree of openness to the rest of the world and a
stronger current account should correspond to a reduced probability of an exit. We
find that Current Account Balance has a surprising positive sign on its estimated
value. Notwithstanding, our estimated coefficient is not significant.
Openness reflects how connected the economy is to the rest of the world and
reflects trade liberalization. The parameter estimation on the variable Openness is
negative or positive depending on the model specification. However, it is not
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significant. Hence we do not have support for Milesi-Ferreti and Razin (1998)’s
finding that more open economies are less likely to suffer an exchange rate crash.
Claims on Government is included in the model to capture the effect of domestic
credit expansion on the likelihood to abandon a fixed exchange rate regime. The
variable Claims on Government is expected to have a positive estimated parameter
because credit expansion due to the monetarization of the government budget
deficit increases the likelihood of a speculative attack resulting in the abandonment
of a peg. Yet, we find that the estimated coefficient is negative, albeit it non
significant. We also directly test for the effect of domestic credit on the probability
of abandoning a peg by estimating the model using domestic credit (Credit). The
estimated parameter has no effect on the probability of abandoning a peg.
The variable Political Rights is included as a proxy for the quality of
institutions. It is likely that countries with a stronger institutional framework will
be able to sustain a fixed exchange rate regime for a longer period of time. We find
that the estimate on Political Rights is positive and highly significant in model
specification (3) indicating that the more democratic institutions a country has the
more likely it will maintain a peg. A stronger democratic country means a better
quality of institutions. The fact that better quality of institutions tend to reduce
the probability of an exit from a peg is not surprising, given that these institutions,
including the central banks, have more credibility.
Unemployment is expected to increase the probability of exit from a fixed
exchange rate regime. An increase in unemployment reflects the fall in economic
activity which increases the vulnerability to currency crisis. Our results indicate
that Unemployment is not a significant determinant of a switch from a fixed to a
flexible exchange rate regime14.
14The insignificance of the Unemployment variable could be attributed to the fact that the lack
of competitiveness is already captured through the variable GDP Growth.
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Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER) is expected to have a positive sign. REER
can be used as a proxy for the loss of international price competitiveness as well as
for exchange rate misalignment. When a country devalues its currency, the trading
partners’ position deteriorates with regards to that country’s economy. A higher
value of the exchange rate index implies a more appreciated domestic real exchange
rate leading to a less likelihood of abandoning a fixed exchange rate regime in that
country Kumar et al. (1998). Our results show that the conditional probability of
an exit is not significantly affected by REER.
The variable Reserves, which measures the level of international reserves (minus
gold) held by a country, remains negative and insignificant except in model
specification (6). However, this significance is not robust. The negative sign on
Reserves is expected for a country that has a high level of foreign reserves which
can maintain its peg easily. Similar reasoning can be applied for expecting the
negative sign associated with Net Foreign Assets. In our estimations we find that
the direction of the coefficient on Net Foreign Asset varies but remains insignificant.
I.4.3 Intra-country Correlation
As we have shown in Table 4, countries could have multiple exits from a fixed
exchange rate regime to a floating exchange rate regime during the period of
observation. A major issue in extending proportional hazard regression models to
multiple events per subject is the intra-subject correlation which violates the
assumption of independent observation in the standard Cox model (Therneau and
Grambsch 2000).
The first step to analyzing multiple failure data is deciding whether the failure
events are ordered or unordered. Then we need to decide if the failure events are the
same type or of different type. In our case we have ordered failure events, because a
country can’t experience its second exit from a peg before its first. Moreover, the
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hazard function is not allowed to vary by failure type because we only have one
definition of an exit from a peg.
The two common approaches that are utilized to analyze correlated ordered
events are the (Andersen and Gill 1982) model (AG) and the (Wei et al. 1989)
model (WLW). Both of these approaches are marginal regression models in thatβˆ is
determined from a fit that ignores the correlation between the events followed by a
correction of the variance. The results of the AG estimations are presented in Table
7, while the estimated results for the WLW model are found in Table 8.
The results of the AG estimation match those of the piecewise constant (PWC)
model with regards to signs, even though magnitudes vary. GDP Growth appears to
be the only robust significant variable that affects the conditional probability of an
exit from a fixed exchange rate regime. Surprisingly, however, we find that Current
Account Balance carries a significant positive sign. We expect that when the
Current Account Balance is positive that exports are greater than imports, in which
case a country on a peg should continue its peg for currency stability as opposed to
abandoning the peg. Hence, this unexpected result could possibly be explained by
the limitation of the Andersen-Gill model, where the fact that there are multiple
events occurring at a given time is not allowed.
The negative and significant results associated with GDP Growth and the
positive and significant results found for Political Rights are reiterated in the WLW
estimations. Current Account Balance is also positive and significant in the third
specification of the WLW model which is surprising, but the result is not robust.
Furthermore, Reserves, Openness, and Unemployment have the expected sign, albeit
the coefficients are not significant. The signs on the parameter estimates on
Inflation, Current Account Balance, and Claims on Government are not consistent
with the predictions of economic theory. Notwithstanding, the coefficients are not
significant.
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I.5 Final Remarks
In this paper we employ a duration model approach towards the determination of
the choice of exchange rate regime, in particular the conditional probability of exit
from a fixed exchange rate regime. To this effect, we use both non-parametric and
semi-parametric techniques to estimate hazard functions. The main objective of this
study was to test if time spent on a fixed exchange rate regime was a determinant of
the probability of exit into a flexible exchange rate regime. The results both from
the non-parametric Kaplan-Meier estimator and the semi-parametric piecewise
constant proportional hazard model uncover significant duration dependence (with a
small but not significant positive dependence at the beginning). It appears that
time spent within a regime is itself significant determinant of the probability of exit
from a fixed exchange rate regime. This fact may suggest that as the credibility of
the peg increases over time the need to abandon a peg decreases.
Furthermore, to the extent that duration dependence may be driven by
time-varying covariates, we also estimated a semi-parametric proportional hazard
model as well as marginal models. GDP growth appears to be the only variable that
robustly affects the conditional probability to abandon a peg. A decrease in GDP
growth is associated with an increase in the likelihood of an exit from a fixed
exchange rate regime. This result is consistent with the predictions of economic
theory in that countries facing a recession would be more likely to abandon a peg in
order to stimulate exports and boost output. Other time-varying macroeconomic,
financial, and institutional variables don’t appear to have a significant effect on the
probability of abandoning a peg.
However, the issue of duration dependence deserves further investigation. It is
especially imperative to understand the different paths that countries take to move
from a fixed exchange rate regimes to non-fixed exchange rate regimes. Some exits
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have been orderly while other exits have been very disruptive due to the fact that
authorities are devaluing without a choice signaling that they have lost control.
Moreover, even though a negative GDP growth is a highly significant determinant of
the probability to abandon a peg, the recent global financial crisis has shown that
some emerging economies are still holding on to their peg despite economic
hardship. Therefore, in the next two chapters we provide hypothesis as to why
countries would be reluctant to abandon a peg.
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Figure 1: Smoothed Hazard Estimate and Kaplan-Meier Survivor Estimate
Figure 2: Nelson-Aalen Cumulative Hazard Estimate
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Figure 3: Estimated base-line hazard
Table 1: Expected Signs for Explanatory Variables
Explanatory Variables Expected Sign
GDP Growth -
Inflation +
Openness -
Current Account Balance -
REER +
Unemployment +
Claims on Government +
Net Foreign Assets -
International Reserves -
Political Rights -
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Table 2: Distribution of Total Peg Spells
T Frequency Percent Cum.
1 76 1.54 1.54
2 192 3.89 5.42
3 149 3.01 8.44
4 152 3.08 11.51
5 93 1.88 13.4
6 197 3.99 17.38
7 114 2.31 19.69
8 164 3.32 23.01
9 104 2.1 25.11
10 76 1.54 26.65
11 110 2.23 28.87
12 110 2.23 31.1
13 198 4.01 35.11
14 145 2.93 38.04
15 148 2.99 41.04
16 38 0.77 41.8
18 295 5.97 47.77
19 115 2.33 50.1
20 190 3.84 53.95
21 76 1.54 55.48
22 152 3.08 58.56
23 76 1.54 60.1
24 76 1.54 61.63
26 114 2.31 63.94
28 38 0.77 64.71
29 38 0.77 65.48
30 110 2.23 67.71
31 76 1.54 69.24
32 114 2.31 71.55
33 38 0.77 72.32
34 76 1.54 73.86
35 76 1.54 75.39
36 38 0.77 76.16
37 38 0.77 76.93
38 1,140 23.07 100
Total 4,942
Mean 141
Median 110
Stadard Deviation 183
Range [1,38]
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Table 3: Distribution of Completed Spells
T Frequency Percent Cum.
1 76 2.98 2.98
2 154 6.04 9.02
3 76 2.98 12
4 76 2.98 14.99
5 76 2.98 17.97
6 55 2.16 20.13
7 114 4.47 24.6
8 114 4.47 29.07
9 53 2.08 31.15
10 38 1.49 32.64
11 72 2.82 35.46
12 76 2.98 38.45
13 76 2.98 41.43
14 53 2.08 43.51
15 76 2.98 46.49
18 76 2.98 49.47
19 76 2.98 52.45
20 190 7.45 59.91
21 76 2.98 62.89
22 152 5.96 68.85
23 76 2.98 71.83
24 76 2.98 74.81
26 114 4.47 79.29
28 38 1.49 80.78
29 38 1.49 82.27
30 72 2.82 85.09
31 76 2.98 88.07
32 114 4.47 92.55
33 38 1.49 94.04
34 76 2.98 97.02
35 38 1.49 98.51
37 38 1.49 100
Total 2,549
Mean 80
Median 76
Stadard Deviation 36
Range [1,37]
Table 4: Number of Total Exits from a Peg
No. of Exits Freq. Percent Cum.
0 2,393 48.42 48.42
1 1,635 33.08 81.51
2 724 14.65 96.16
3 114 2.31 98.46
4 76 1.54 100
Total 4,942 100
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Table 5: Exit from a Peg Per Time Period
Year Period exitpeg=0 exitpeg=1 Total
1970 1 144 0 144
1971 2 137 7 144
1972 3 132 12 144
1973 4 135 9 144
1974 5 141 3 144
1975 6 142 2 144
1976 7 142 2 144
1977 8 142 2 144
1978 9 139 5 144
1979 10 142 2 144
1980 11 144 0 144
1981 12 141 3 144
1982 13 139 5 144
1983 14 139 5 144
1984 15 141 3 144
1985 16 139 3 142
1986 17 136 4 140
1987 18 124 1 125
1988 19 122 1 123
1989 20 120 3 123
1990 21 120 1 121
1991 22 118 3 121
1992 23 118 3 121
1993 24 117 3 120
1994 25 120 0 120
1995 26 119 1 120
1996 27 120 0 120
1997 28 119 1 120
1998 29 113 7 120
1999 30 118 2 120
2000 31 117 3 120
2001 32 120 0 120
2002 33 115 4 119
2003 34 114 1 115
2004 35 113 1 114
2005 36 114 0 114
2006 37 113 0 113
2007 38 109 1 110
Total 4,839 103 4,942
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Table 6: Piecewise Constant Proportional Hazard Estimations
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
yr2 -17.17 -16.84 -17.66 -16.97 -17.17 -17.15
(6,342) (5,756) (6,075) (4,791) (6,351) (3,502)
yr3 -18.43 -18.08 -18.87 -15.94 -18.42 -16.10
(2,560) (2,327) (2,594) (2,475) (2,559) (1,832)
yr4 -2.405* -2.282* -3.085** 0.305 -2.398* -0.303
(1.279) (1.306) (1.396) (1.852) (1.284) (1.967)
yr5-yr6 -3.166** -3.070** -3.577*** -2.170 -3.156** -2.952
(1.254) (1.273) (1.329) (1.717) (1.257) (1.952)
yr7-yr8 -17.59 -17.25 -17.74 -17.37 -17.59 -17.41
(1,539) (1,397) (1,485) (1,571) (1,541) (1,142)
yr9-yr10 -17.36 -17.06 -17.60 -17.08 -17.36 -16.96
(1,548) (1,408) (1,506) (1,564) (1,549) (1,152)
yr11-yr16 -3.264*** -3.225*** -3.531*** -2.958* -3.264*** -3.629**
(0.641) (0.646) (0.707) (1.541) (0.643) (1.806)
yr17-yr26 -3.544*** -3.530*** -3.850*** -3.335** -3.546*** -3.902**
(0.598) (0.605) (0.655) (1.445) (0.601) (1.718)
yr27-yr38 -3.270*** -3.258*** -3.699*** -3.375** -3.275*** -3.972**
(0.595) (0.596) (0.692) (1.440) (0.600) (1.732)
Inflation -0.00172 -0.00183 -0.00231 -0.0111 -0.00173 -0.0100
(0.00294) (0.00304) (0.00323) (0.00837) (0.00297) (0.00808)
GDP Growth -0.217*** -0.215*** -0.246*** -0.218*** -0.216*** -0.225***
(0.0340) (0.0345) (0.0391) (0.0557) (0.0340) (0.0583)
Reserves -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0*
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0)
Openness -0.00374 -0.00420 -0.00334 0.00264 -0.00369 0.00327
(0.00555) (0.00570) (0.00579) (0.00598) (0.00559) (0.00624)
Current Account Balance 0.0352 0.0426 0.0487 0.0637 0.0355 0.0517
(0.0295) (0.0331) (0.0319) (0.0414) (0.0296) (0.0455)
Claims on Government -0.00510 -0.00570 -0.00526 -0.00676 -0.00543 -0.00533
(0.0121) (0.0123) (0.0121) (0.0172) (0.0122) (0.0169)
Unemployment 0.0259 0.0228 0.0152 0.0299 0.0266 0.0360
(0.0300) (0.0310) (0.0316) (0.0352) (0.0300) (0.0346)
Net Foreign Asset -0.00148 0.00651
(0.00319) (0.00695)
Political Rights 0.0748* 0.0545
(0.0404) (0.0566)
REER -0.00136 0.00190
(0.00949) (0.0102)
Credit 0
(0)
Number of Obs. 1,617 1,617 1,615 1,091 1,617 1,091
Standard errors in parenthesis. ***(**,*) indicates statistical significance at the 1 (5,10) percent
level.
We also implemented a PWC proportional hazard model that accounted for unobserved hetero-
geneity but didn’t get any convergence.
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Table 7: Andersen-Gill Estimations (Ordered Multiple Exit Data
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Inflation -0.000544 -0.000490 -0.000554 -0.00809 -0.000524 -0.00631
(0.00148) (0.00144) (0.00146) (0.00723) (0.00146) (0.00656)
GDP Growth -0.192*** -0.194*** -0.211*** -0.181*** -0.194*** -0.205**
(0.0313) (0.0329) (0.0390) (0.0644) (0.0326) (0.0811)
Reserves -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0*
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0)
Openness -0.00181 -0.00163 -0.00177 0.00204 -0.00181 0.00434
(0.00447) (0.00448) (0.00488) (0.00399) (0.00442) (0.00481)
Current Account Balance 0.0648** 0.0620** 0.0631** 0.0614 0.0645** 0.0391
(0.0264) (0.0276) (0.0271) (0.0484) (0.0264) (0.0488)
Claims on Government -0.00557 -0.00548 -0.00655 -0.0149 -0.00551 -0.0143
(0.00854) (0.00849) (0.00847) (0.0173) (0.00856) (0.0172)
Unemployment 0.0428 0.0434 0.0338 0.0394 0.0426 0.0419
(0.0279) (0.0281) (0.0302) (0.0328) (0.0281) (0.0319)
Net Foreign Asset 0.000618 0.00699
(0.00238) (0.00493)
Political Rights 0.0591** 0.0670
(0.0295) (0.0413)
REER 0.000125 0.00318
(0.00793) (0.0106)
Credit -0
(0)
Number of Obs. 1,585 1,585 1,583 1,076 1,585 1,076
Standard errors in parenthesis. ***(**,*) indicates statistical significance at the 1 (5,10) percent
level.
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Table 8: Wei,Lin, Weissfeld Estimations (Ordered Multiple Exit Data)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Inflation -0.000470 -0.000529 -0.000478 -0.00569 -0.000463 -0.00466
(0.00132) (0.00136) (0.00131) (0.00638) (0.00131) (0.00584)
GDP Growth -0.175*** -0.172*** -0.193*** -0.156** -0.176*** -0.173**
(0.0311) (0.0324) (0.0376) (0.0606) (0.0328) (0.0731)
Reserves -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0)
Openness -0.000601 -0.000786 -0.000598 0.00205 -0.000608 0.00373
(0.00425) (0.00430) (0.00471) (0.00461) (0.00422) (0.00520)
Current Account Balance 0.0453 0.0494* 0.0440 0.0385 0.0451 0.0253
(0.0277) (0.0286) (0.0286) (0.0515) (0.0278) (0.0499)
Claims on Government -0.00706 -0.00717 -0.00806 -0.0216 -0.00705 -0.0202
(0.00844) (0.00852) (0.00840) (0.0195) (0.00844) (0.0186)
Unemployment 0.0390 0.0382 0.0287 0.0413 0.0389 0.0441
(0.0296) (0.0301) (0.0316) (0.0333) (0.0299) (0.0328)
Net Foreign Asset -0.000861 0.00445
(0.00257) (0.00580)
Political Rights 0.0625** 0.0654
(0.0295) (0.0418)
REER -0.00204 0.00142
(0.00903) (0.0116)
Credit -0
(0)
Number of Obs. 1,585 1,585 1,583 1,076 1,585 1,076
Standard errors in parenthesis. ***(**,*) indicates statistical significance at the 1 (5,10) percent
level.
Chapter II
INFLATION UNCERTAINTY AND THE DECISION TO DEVALUE
II.1 Introduction
In the typical rules-versus-discretion framework, e.g. Obstfeld (1997), the choice
between fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes is a choice between financial
stability and output stability. A fixed exchange rate regime delivers low inflation
but it also restricts monetary policy. If the economy is growing the limits to
stabilization policy are not a problem. However, a large negative economic shock
could induce a switch to a flexible exchange rate regime as the benefits of
expansionary policy become greater than the benefits of low inflation. Predicting
whether a country would abandon its fixed exchange rate depends on the extent of
economic hardship it is willing to bear.
That framework seems to explain behavior well with one caveat: many countries
maintain their fixed exchange rate regimes despite extreme economic hardship. The
recent experience of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, four countries with
currency boards, exemplifies this “fear of floating,” as termed by Calvo and
Reinhart (2002). Each of these countries experienced double digit decline in output
but did not float their currency. A decade earlier, Argentina opted for preserving its
currency board despite a prolonged and deep decline in output until it was forced to
devalue in 2001.
32
33
We explore this reluctance to devalue from one particular perspective. We argue
that uncertainty about inflation under a floating exchange rate regime can act as a
significant deterrent to the decision to devalue. Many countries hold their exchange
rate fixed in order to stabilize prices after a period of high inflation, a legacy that
raises concerns about the ability of the central bank to manage monetary policy.
These doubts are further exacerbated by the lack of monetary policy experience
while the country operates under a peg. Whether or not the central bank can
deliver stable prices post-devaluation is a real concern in these circumstances.
We investigate the effect of inflation uncertainty on currency policy in a simple
model that builds on the well-known and widely utilized fixed exchange rate with
escape clause framework of Obstfeld (1997). A country operates on a fixed exchange
rate regime and, after it experiences a negative economic shock, has to decide
whether to continue operating the peg or to devalue. Assuming rational
expectations, the possibility of a policy shift in case of a large negative shock is
anticipated by economic agents. We introduce inflation uncertainty into that
framework and investigate its effect on the decision to devalue. The rationale is
based on bodies of literature dealing with credibility and reputation of monetary
policy as in Kydland and Prescott (1977), Cukierman (1985), and Blackburn and
Christensen (1989). We show that the size of the shock that is required to induce a
switch from a peg to a float increases with inflation uncertainty. In other words,
inflation uncertainty makes abandoning a fixed exchange rate regime less likely.
We test this prediction using survey data from Bulgaria’s currency board. The
survey data were collected at the height of economic hardship during the recent
economic slowdown when, according to theory, removing the fixed exchange rate
could gain significant support. Instead, the data show strong support for
maintaining the currency board. The survey is uniquely useful for our purposes as it
also asks respondents about inflation if the currency board were removed. This
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allows us to establish that: 1) uncertainty about inflation is very high and 2)
inflation uncertainty reduces substantially the support for moving to a floating
exchange rate regime.
To our knowledge, the empirical part of this paper is the first investigation of the
support for a fixed exchange rate regime on the micro level. The literature offers
multiple analyses on the macro level investigating the determinants of exchange rate
policy (Eichengreen et al. (1995), Szapary and Jakab (1998), Guobing (2003), and
VonHagen and Zhou (2007)). The advantage of the micro-level analysis is that it
allows us to investigate the heterogeneity within a country. For example, we show
that the support for maintaining the currency board increases in age, risk aversion,
and education. The literature has also investigated the triggers for a change from
one currency regime to another (Frankel (1999), Velasco (2000), Williamson (2000),
and Fischer (2001)). In contrast, our analysis focuses on the question why a change
in regime did not occur.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section presents the
theoretical model. Section 3 explains the significance of the timing of the survey.
Section 4 describes the survey data and sections 5 and 6 provide empirical analysis.
We conclude with final remarks in Section 7.
II.2 Model
We present a simple Barro and Gordon (1983) type model where the central bank
chooses between a fixed exchange rate regime without monetary policy and a
floating exchange rate regime with discretionary monetary policy. There are two
sources of uncertainty. A supply shock could impact the economy after agents have
formed inflation expectations but before the central bank decides whether or not to
devalue. A monetary shock could occur after the decision to devalue has been made,
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driving inflation away from the target of the central bank. Thus, the central bank
and the public face uncertainty about the inflation rate following devaluation.
II.2.1 Basic Setup
The economy’s level of output y (all variables in logarithm) is given by the Philips
curve:
y = y¯ + (pi − Epi)− u, (12)
where y¯ is the natural level of output, pi is inflation, Epi is expected inflation,
and u is a supply shock with mean zero and variance σ2u. The central bank’s
objective is to stabilize both output and inflation around the values y˜ and p¯i:
min
pi
L = (y − y˜)2 + α(pi − p¯i)2, (13)
where α > 0 reflects its aversion to high inflation. The desired level of output is
greater than the natural level of output so that y˜ − y¯ = k > 0, a policy that
generates the inflation bias of discretionary monetary policy.
The central bank is operating under a fixed exchange rate regime and purchasing
power parity implies that pi = 0. Agents expect the peg to be maintained with
probability q or abandoned with probability (1− q). Therefore, because inflation
under the peg is zero, expected inflation is given by:
Epi = (1− q)pie, (14)
where pie is expected inflation conditional on removing the fixed exchange rate.
The expectations are rational and formed before the realization of the shock u.
After observing the shock u, the central bank can choose to keep or to abandon the
peg. If the fixed exchange rate is abandoned, the central bank intends to set
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inflation at by solving (13). For simplicity, we assume that the target inflation rate
under a flexible exchange rate is p¯i = 0.
If the central bank adopts a flexible exchange rate regime, actual inflation may
differ from the intended level by the value of a monetary shock  with mean 0 and
variance σ2 . Thus, actual inflation under discretion is (pi + ). Note that the
monetary shock can affect the economy only if the central bank decides to float the
currency. We assume that the supply shock and the monetary shock are
independent.
We now proceed to find optimal inflation if the peg is abandoned. Substituting
(14) into (12) and then (12) into (13) yields:
min
pi
= (pi + − E[(1− q)(pi + )]− k − u)2 + α(pi + )2. (15)
Take the derivative of (15) with respect to inflation and set equal to zero. This
yields the first order condition:
[pi + − E(pi − qpi + − q)− u− k] + α(pi + ) = 0. (16)
Next, taking expectations of equation (16) conditional on a switch to a discretionary
regime and solving for pie yields:
pie =
k
(α + q)
. (17)
Respectively, from (14), expected inflation is given by:
Epi = (1− q) k
(α + q)
. (18)
Note that if the likelihood of devaluation is zero, i.e. q = 1, then expected
inflation is also zero. At the other extreme, when the likelihood of maintaining the
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fixed exchange rate is zero, i.e. q = 0, expected inflation becomes k/α, which is the
solution to the standard one-period Barro-Gordon model.
Using our solution for expected inflation, we can then find the optimal inflation
rate that minimizes the central bank’s loss associated with a policy shift toward
discretion:
pi∗ =
k
(α + q)(1 + α)
+
k
(1 + α)
+
u
(1 + α)
. (19)
From (19), we see that inflation increases in k; that is, the greater the difference
between the desired and the natural level of output, the more incentive the central
bank has to boost output by increasing inflation. Inflation also increases with the
size of the shock u but decreases in α, the central bank’s aversion to high inflation.
II.2.2 The Decision to Devalue
After the shock u is realized, the loss to the central bank associated with keeping
the peg is given by:
LP = [y¯ + (p¯i − Epi)− u− y˜]2 = (k + u+ Epi)2. (20)
The third term in the parenthesis Epi captures the loss from incomplete credibility
of the fixed exchange rate. From (18) with q < 1, expected inflation is positive and
works as a drag on economic activity via the Philip’s curve equation. This raises the
loss associated with the fixed exchange rate. With a fully credible fixed exchange
rate regime (q = 1) expected inflation is zero and the loss depends only on the size
of the economic shock u whose impact cannot be softened under the peg and on the
output objective k that also cannot be met using monetary policy under the peg.
The loss if the peg is abandoned is random (through ), so we need to consider
the expected loss, given by:
38
LD = E
[(
(1 + α + q)
(α + q)
+
u
(1 + α)
+ − k
(α + q)
− k − u
)2
+α
(
(
(1 + α + q)k
(α + q)(1 + α)
+
u
(1 + α)
+ 
)2]
(21)
Note that the central bank calculates its losses under the different exchange rate
regimes after observing the shock u and therefore has no uncertainty associated
with it. The only source of uncertainty comes through the monetary shock .
Taking expectations of (21) and rearranging terms yields:
LD =
α
(1 + α)
(k + u+ Epi)2 + (α + 1)σ2 . (22)
Note that the loss associated with the flexible exchange rate regime is positively
related to the variance of the money shock σ2 . The effect of inflation uncertainty on
the loss is magnified by the term α, the central bank’s aversion to high inflation.
The switch to discretion occurs when LP − LD > C, where C is the cost
associated with abandoning the peg. This could reflect, for example, the loss of
political support for the government and the loss of reputation for the central bank.
We denote with u∗ the value of the supply shock u that satisfies the condition with
equality. Using (20) and (22) and rearranging terms we obtain:
u∗ =
√
(1 + α)[C + (1 + α)σ2 ]− k − Epi. (23)
In (23) the threshold value of the shock u∗ and expected inflation Epi are jointly
determined as the probability that the peg will be maintained q is a function of u∗
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and, in turn, expected inflation depends on that probability through (18). The
probability that the peg will be maintained can then be expressed by:
q = F (u∗), (24)
where F is the cumulative distribution function of the shock u. It follows that
dq
du∗ = F
′
(u∗) = f(u∗) > 0 and therefore dEpi
du∗ < 0.
Our primary analytical interest lies in the effect of σ2 on u
∗. Differentiating (12)
with respect to σ2 yields:
du∗
dσ2
= v − dEpi
du∗
du∗
dσ2
, (25)
where v > 0 is the differential of the square rooted term in (23)15 . We can
rearrange equation (25) as follows:
du∗
dσ2
(1 +
dEpi
du∗
) = v > 0. (26)
Stability requires
∣∣dEpi
du∗
∣∣ < 1, which implies the following relationship16:
du∗
dσ2
> 0. (27)
Equation (27) shows that uncertainty associated with the monetary shock raises
the threshold value of the supply shock below which the central bank does not
devalue. In other words, all else equal, the central bank is less likely to devalue and
15
v =
(1 + α)2
2
((1 + α)[C + (1 + α)σ2 ])
− 12
16Carlson and Valev (2008) show that a small cost of devaluation, a high value for k, and a small
value for α yield two solutions for u∗ (a low u∗ and a high u∗)as proposed by Obstfeld (1997).
However, low u∗, obtained when dEpidu∗ < −1, suggests that the central bank will devalue for shocks
u < u∗ rather than for shocks u > u∗.Carlson and Valev (2008) further demonstrate that a low
u∗ and an increase in C, the cost of devaluation, leads to greater rather than smaller likelihood
of devaluations. These scenarios, while technically possible, run counter to basic intuition and are
ruled out.
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the population is less likely to support floating the currency if there is substantial
uncertainty about the level of inflation following devaluation.
II.3 Choosing Internal Adjustment in Bulgaria
The Bulgarian currency board was implemented in 1997 after a severe financial
crisis that caused extreme exchange rate depreciation, hyperinflation, and the
failure of many banks (Dobrinsky 2000) and (Berlemann et al. 2002). In January
1997, inflation reached 500 percent on an annual basis and the local currency (lev)
depreciated multiple times in the first quarter of 1997. The central bank depleted
its international reserves to less than two months worth of imports in an effort to
soften the currency depreciation. The crisis sparked massive protests that brought
down the government and the new administration opted to stabilize prices by
implementing a currency board. The currency board was introduced a few months
later on July 1, 1997.
The 1997 crisis was the most sweeping episode of high inflation in Bulgaria but
it was not the first one. It was preceded by another period of high inflation and
currency depreciation in 1994 and by an earlier similar episode in 1991. Therefore,
by 1997 Bulgarians had drawn the conclusion that their central bank was not
capable and/or is not allowed to manage monetary policy responsibly. They gave
overwhelming parliamentary majority to a political party that promised to eliminate
discretion over money supply by the law of the currency board. Thus, it is
reasonable to assume that the memories from the period preceding the currency
board are characterized by financial instability and monetary policy
mismanagement.
A currency board is a variation of a fixed exchange rate regime where the change
in money supply is linked to the balance of payments and the monetary authorities
forgo discretionary control over the money supply. One important difference
41
between currency boards and a regular peg is that currency boards have a legal
framework. The rules and legal framework of the Bulgarian currency board are
written into the Law of the Bulgarian National Bank. Moreover, the central bank
maintains foreign exchange reserves that cover the entire monetary base and is
prohibited from lending to the government. Because of these features currency
boards are often referred to as “hard” pegs, i.e. difficult to revoke. Removing the
currency board would require an act of Parliament which makes this a much more
political decision, a decision that has to carry the support of the majority of
political representatives. This is important in our analysis because the survey data
discussed next probes the opinions of the population. The legal framework of the
currency board allows these opinions to have direct influence on actual policy.
Currency boards eliminate, or at least substantially restrict, the scope for
monetary policy. Hence, at the time the data used in this paper were collected, the
Bulgarian central bank had not utilized the tools of monetary policy for over a
decade. Removing the currency board would necessitate the reintroduction and
refinement of these tools. That, along with the memories of the pre-currency board
inflation experience, could increase the uncertainty about monetary policy outcomes
if the currency board is removed, i.e. it could raise σ2 .
Following the introduction of the currency board and a series of structural
reforms, Bulgaria experienced a decade of significant economic growth. The
prolonged period of financial stability as well as the membership in the European
Union attracted substantial amounts of international investment. However,
although the massive capital inflows helped raise living standards, they also
contributed to a large current account deficits. By 2008, the current account deficit
stood at over 25 percent of GDP (Figure 3). The sustainability of Bulgaria’s
external balances was a major policy concern even before the onset of the global
financial crisis. The capital inflows had fueled relatively high inflation since 1997
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which, along with the fixed exchange rate, contributed to declining competitiveness
over time. The long-term positive impact of the capital flows on economic growth
was also doubtful as much of the capital was directed to the real estate sector.
With the start of the financial crisis the Bulgarian economy slowed down
substantially. GDP contracted by 5.1 percent in 2009 - the first decline since the
crisis of 1996-1997- and unemployment sharply increased to double digits, creating a
textbook scenario for considering devaluation. Large capital inflows leading to real
appreciation and an unsustainable current account deficit, followed by a major
economic shock usually form a lethal combination for currency pegs.
Yet, in the summer of 2010, in the midst of the economic hardship, Bulgarians
went to the polls and elected a political party whose centerpiece economic policy
item was to maintain financial stability under the currency board. With the support
of the population, the policymakers chose internal adjustment through cuts in
spending and high unemployment. The “sudden stop” of capital inflows was
immediately followed by a sharp decline in income, consumption, and imports so
that the current account deficit closed within a year. Although the drastic measures
generated some public unrest and resentment, none of it appeared directed against
the currency board.
II.4 Survey Data on Currency Policy Preferences
The paper uses data from a national household survey in Bulgaria administered in
November 2010. The sample contains responses from 1016 individuals and its
demographic structure in terms of age, education level, income, and gender is
representative of the population of 7.5 million. The survey was carried out by a
network of professional interviewers for Vitosha Research, one of the major polling
agencies in Bulgaria17. The survey included two questions that directly inquire
17The survey questionnaire and the data are available from the authors upon request.
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about the choice of fixed vs. flexible exchange rate regimes. Specifically, respondents
were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the following two statements:
Statement 1 : I would support removing the currency board and replacing it with a
floating exchange rate regime.
Statement 2 : I would support a political party that promises to remove the
currency board and to replace it with a floating exchange rate regime.
Table 9 shows minimal support for switching to a floating exchange rate regime.
Only 10 percent of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed with statement 1 and
only 7 percent agreed or strongly agreed with statement 2. Approximately half of
the respondents did not support either policy they either stated that they don’t
know or were indifferent between the two currency regimes. Of the ones who
expressed an opinion with agree or disagree answers only 25 percent supported
moving to a floating regime. The support for political parties that advocate
removing the currency board is even weaker. Forty four percent of the respondents
disagreed or strongly disagreed with such support.
The survey also inquired about uncertainty following a potential switch to a
floating exchange rate regime by asking respondents whether they agreed or
disagreed with the following statement:
Statement 3 : It is very difficult to predict what the inflation rate would be if we
remove the currency board and switch to a floating exchange rate regime.
Only 5 percent of the respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed with this
statement while 24 percent strongly agreed that it would be difficult to predict
inflation. Next, we investigate the effect of this uncertainty on respondents’
preferences over currency policy.
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II.5 Support for Devaluation
The estimations in Table 10 investigate the determinants of the support for the
currency board using two dependent variables. In columns (1)-(3) we estimate
probit models with a dummy variable that equals 1 if a respondent either disagreed
or strongly disagreed with removing the currency board , and zero otherwise. We
report the marginal effects from the probit estimations instead of the estimated
coefficients which makes the interpretation of the quantitative effects straightforward
1819. Then in columns (4) and (5) we use the ordered probit methodology and a
dependent variable that takes five values ranging from 1 which indicates strong
opposition to the currency board to 5 which indicates strong support for the
currency board. The advantage of the ordered probit estimations compared to the
probit model is that they utilize more of the variation in the data. However, the
sizes of the estimated effects are not as directly obvious as in the probit model.
The explanatory variable of primary interest in this paper is based on the
question about uncertainty regarding post-currency board inflation. Similar to the
dependent variable, we construct two versions of this variable for the estimations. In
some cases we use a dummy variable that equals 1 if a respondent either agreed or
strongly agreed that inflation would be difficult to predict, and zero otherwise. In
the other estimations we use a variable that ranges from 1 (inflation is easy to
predict) to 5 (inflation is tough to predict).
The remaining control variables are of interest as well. We enter age in number
of years. Older respondents may have stronger memories of the pre-currency board
financial instability and may therefore be less supportive of moving back to a
floating exchange rate regime. The currency board was implemented 13 years before
18Estimated marginal effects are calculated at the mean of the independent variable.
19Estimated coefficients for the probit models are found in Appendix B.
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the survey and many younger people have no personal knowledge of the pre-crisis
experience.
We also account for respondents’ level of education and think of it as a proxy for
how informed a respondent is about the economy. The effect of education is
ambiguous. One could argue that removing the currency board and the ensuing
currency depreciation would give a boost to economic activity. However,
devaluations could also be very disruptive with negative effects on the overall
economy or particular social groups. Thus, the opinion of an informed person is
difficult to predict.
The models also include income as individuals with higher income might have a
greater stake in preserving financial stability. Arguably, people with higher incomes
also have greater assets whose value might decline in case of devaluation and high
inflation. We also include a dummy variable for employment status that equals 1 for
unemployed individuals. Unlike high income individuals, unemployed people might
perceive a greater benefit from a flexible exchange rate regime that gives more
flexibility to the authorities to engage in activist policy.
The model also includes a measure of risk aversion based on whether a
respondent agreed or disagreed with the following statement: “One must always
wear a seat belt when driving.” While removed from the monetary issues
investigated in the paper, this question has been used in the earlier literature to
measure risk aversion Bellante and Link (1981). People who strongly agree that one
should wear a seat belt are considered more risk averse than the rest of the
respondents. In the Bulgarian survey, 67 percent of the respondents believed that
one must always wear a seat belt. Our hypothesis is that these respondents would
be more likely to support the status quo, i.e. the currency board. Finally, the
models also include gender. Details about the construction and summary statistics
of all variables used in the models are presented in the Appendix B.
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The first column in Table 10 reports a probit model with the dummy dependent
variable and the dummy variable for inflation uncertainty. The model excludes all
respondents who answered I don’t know or did not provide any answer. The
estimations show that respondents who are uncertain about inflation following
devaluation are 25 percentage points more likely to support keeping the currency
board. The coefficient estimate on this effect is highly statistically significant. We
observe the same effect in column 2 where we include the I don’t know responses.
The direction of the effect and its statistical significance is confirmed in column 3
where we use the dummy dependent variable but we switch to the inflation
uncertainty variable that takes five different values. In this model, a one step
increase in uncertainty leads to about 9 percentage points greater support for the
currency board.
In the next two columns we employ the ordered probit methodology with a
dependent variable that takes five different values and obtain similar qualitative
results20. Finally, in the last column we report the estimation of a Heckman
selection model where we estimate jointly the decision to give an answer to the
question about currency policy and the determinants of the support for the currency
board. The motivation for estimating this model is that the decision to give an
answer might be correlated with the decision to give a particular answer. Therefore,
not accounting for the former might bias the estimation of the latter. In our case,
the correlation coefficient is not statistically significant indicating that selection bias
is not an issue21.
Looking at the remaining explanatory variables, we observe that age, higher
income, and risk aversion are indeed associated with greater support for keeping the
currency board. Education also increases the level of support for the currency board
20For the specification of the ordered probit model refer to Appendix B.
21For robustness we also estimated the models without income as about 20 percent of the respon-
dents did not provide answers to that question which reduces the sizes of our samples. We obtain
the same effects as those reported in the paper.
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while being unemployed has no statistically significant effect of these preferences.
We experimented with non-linear terms for age and income as well as alternative
formulations for the education and employment status variables but the results seem
to be fairly linear and no additional statistically significant results were obtained.
Table 11 reports the results of the same estimations as in Table 10 but
investigating the support for political parties that would keep the currency board.
As could be expected, the estimation results are almost identical. Nonetheless, the
similarity of estimations confirms that currency policy preferences carry over to
political choices. Given the opinions expressed in the survey, it is no wonder that
each political party is firmly committed to keeping the currency board and that,
therefore, the currency board is maintained despite economic hardship.
II.6 Final Remarks
The theory and evidence presented in this paper show that fixed exchange rate
regimes can enjoy substantial support despite their limitations on stabilization
policy. This support is partly explained by the uncertainty associated with a switch
to flexible exchange rates and discretionary policy. The status quo of financial
stability and output volatility is preferred to a currency policy change with an
uncertain inflation outcome. The evidence suggests why countries might be
unwilling to abandon fixed exchange rate regimes despite the extreme economic
hardship brought by internal adjustment.
We should finish with a caveat about our particular case study. Bulgaria is also
considering entry into the European Monetary Union and adopting the euro as
official currency. In principle, this could encourage Bulgarians and their government
to sustain the currency board despite the economic hardship and make a direct
transition to the euro. In a parallel paper, we show that, although adopting the
euro is more popular than moving to a flexible exchange rate regime, it has much
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weaker public support compared to the currency board. This lack of support is also
explained by uncertainty about the impacts of the euro on the economy. It seems
that uncertainty is a significant deterrent to make any switch in currency policy.
Therefore, to build support, the expected benefits of a new currency regime would
have to be substantial enough to compensate for the risk of change.
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Figure 4: Bulgaria’s GDP Annual Growth, Current Account, and Official Exchange Rate
(1994-2004)
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Table 9: Currency Policy Preferences and Inflation Uncertainty
Statement 1 Statement 2 Statement 3
(Support for (Support for
Devaluation) pro-devaluation party) (Inflation Uncertainty)
Strongly Agree 2.5 2.2 24.1
Agree 7.7 4.3 38.3
Neither agree or disagree 18.5 15.7 12.1
Disagree 24.8 23.9 4.0
Strongly Disagree 12.7 19.8 1.5
I don’t know 33.9 34.0 20.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Notes: The numbers of the table are percent of the total by type of response.
Statement 1: I would support removing the currency board and moving towards a float.
Statement 2: I would vote for a party that proposes removing the currency board and letting the
lev float.
Statement 3: It is very difficult to predict what the inflation rat would be if we remove the currency
board.
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Table 10: Support for the Currency Board
Dependent Variable: Support for the currency board
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Uncertain 0.252*** 0.294*** 0.0901*** 0.363*** 0.180*** 0.386***
(0.0506) (0.0325) (0.0258) (0.118) (0.0661) (0.0743)
Education 0.0741 0.150*** 0.0714 0.0871 0.0819 -0.0673
(0.0533) (0.0486) (0.0529) (0.106) (0.106) (0.123)
Male 0.0399 0.0493 0.0378 0.0595 0.0610 -0.0347
(0.0458) (0.0370) (0.0457) (0.0936) (0.0938) (0.0927)
Age 0.0601*** 0.0444*** 0.0599*** 0.152*** 0.156*** 0.114***
(0.0139) (0.0111) (0.0137) (0.0282) (0.0279) (0.0195)
Income 0.0208** 0.0304*** 0.0204** 0.0669*** 0.0681*** -0.0103
(0.00864) (0.00703) (0.00862) (0.0177) (0.0177) (0.0176)
Unemployed -0.0382 -0.0116 -0.0393 0.00973 0.0123 -0.0606
(0.0689) (0.0555) (0.0689) (0.142) (0.143) (0.115)
Risk averse 0.154*** 0.102*** 0.160*** 0.226** 0.230** 0.246***
(0.0480) (0.0370) (0.0475) (0.0986) (0.0981) (0.0796)
Constant(cut 1) -0.270 0.198 -0.429***
(0.271) (0.355) (0.112)
Constant(cut 2 0.626** 1.087***
(0.256) (0.347)
Constant(cut 3) 1.580*** 2.038***
(0.259) (0.351)
Constant (cut 4) 2.668*** 3.130***
(0.273) (0.365)
Participation Equation Dependent Variable: 1 if the respondent provided an answer, 0 otherwise
Education 0.735***
(0.147)
Male 0.244***
(0.0907)
Age -7.30e-06
(0.0231)
Income 0.104***
(0.0186)
Employed 0.0204
(0.0972)
Constant -0.346**
(0.159)
Model Wald Chi(7) 56.04*** 129.77*** 48.33*** 52.34*** 52.76*** 271.94***
Wald test of ind. Eq. 0.4218
Prob > chi2
Number of Obs. 533 809 533 533 533 809
Notes: The reported coefficients in columns (1), (2), and (3) are marginal effects. Columns (4) and (5) report coeffi-
cient estimates of an ordered probit model. Column (6) reports the coefficients of a Heckman selection (probit)model.
Standard errors in parenthesis. ***(**,*) indicates statistical significance at the 1 (5,10) percent level.
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Table 11: Support for the Political Party Maintaining the Currency Board
Dependent Variable: Support a pro-currency board political party
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Uncertain 0.249*** 0.329*** 0.0816*** 0.343*** 0.149** 0.406***
(0.0520) (0.0338) (0.0249) (0.116) (0.0594) (0.0893)
Education 0.154*** 0.199*** 0.150*** 0.294*** 0.289*** 0.135
(0.0501) (0.0492) (0.0500) (0.105) (0.105) (0.130)
Male 0.0255 0.0276 0.0239 0.108 0.107 -0.0650
(0.0453) (0.0385) (0.0450) (0.0938) (0.0938) (0.0998)
Age 0.0480*** 0.0324*** 0.0479*** 0.0647** 0.0667** 0.0939***
(0.0138) (0.0115) (0.0136) (0.0285) (0.0282) (0.0297)
Income 0.0234*** 0.0337*** 0.0229*** 0.0351* 0.0354** 0.000274
(0.00853) (0.00724) (0.00848) (0.0180) (0.0179) (0.0193)
Unemployed -0.00331 0.00406 -0.00600 -0.0441 -0.0440 -0.0245
(0.0669) (0.0571) (0.0674) (0.158) (0.158) (0.128)
Risk averse 0.167*** 0.121*** 0.174*** 0.125 0.133 0.304***
(0.0479) (0.0388) (0.0473) (0.101) (0.101) (0.0872)
Constant(cut 1) -0.861*** -0.515 -0.372
(0.264) (0.331) (0.258)
Constant(cut 2) -0.340 0.00261
(0.260) (0.335)
Constant(cut 3) 0.600** 0.935***
(0.262) (0.340)
Constant(cut 4) 1.538*** 1.873***
(0.272) (0.350)
Constant(cut 5) 2.591*** 2.931***
(0.298) (0.373)
Participation Equation Dependent Variable: 1 if the respondent provided an answer, 0 otherwise
Education 0.725***
(0.148)
Male 0.242**
(0.0975)
Age 0.00214
(0.0286)
Income 0.108***
(0.0203)
Employed 0.0148
(0.108)
Constant -0.377*
(0.225)
Wald Chi(7) 61.60*** 147.96*** 43.29*** 35.58*** 32.23*** 48.22***
Wald test of ind. Eq. 0.7131
Prob > chi2
Number of Obs. 533 809 533 533 533 809
Notes: The reported coefficients in columns (1), (2), and (3) are marginal effects. Columns (4) and (5) report coeffi-
cient estimates of an ordered probit model. Column (6) reports the coefficients of a Heckman selection (probit)model.
Standard errors in parenthesis. ***(**,*) indicates statistical significance at the 1 (5,10) percent level.
Chapter III
SAFETY IN NUMBERS: PUBLIC ATTITUDE TOWARDS
ADOPTING THE EURO IN BULGARIA
III.1 Introduction
The decision to join a currency union, such as the European Monetary Union
(EMU), is a choice to join a fixed exchange rate regime and to abandon monetary
autonomy. Once a country enters a currency union, the utilization of a common
currency will permanently affect the economic conditions in the country. As such,
the choice to join a currency union, namely the EMU, must be preceded by a
cost-benefit analysis by periphery countries. On the benefit side, currency unions
eliminate exchange rate fluctuations among the countries involved as well as the
costs associated with them, resulting in the promotion of trade and investment
among the countries in the Union. Furthermore, currency unions can enhance an
inflation-prone country’s credibility in fighting inflation Agenor (1994), Giavazzi and
Pagano (1988). Against these benefits of currency unions must be set the loss of
monetary policy as an independent policy instrument. Countries that join a
currency union lose their individual currencies and along with it the ability to use
the exchange rate as a buffer against domestic and foreign disturbances. Economic
shocks will affect each member of the currency union differently. Yet, each member
of the currency union no longer has the ability to take an individual policy response
to economic shocks.
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The cost-benefit analysis for periphery countries vis− a`− vis joining the EMU
was altered by the global financial crisis that took place during 2007-2009. The
financial crisis was unexpectedly severe. Although at the heart of the crisis was a
disruption of the financial sector (Gorton (2010), Kindleberger and Aliber (2005)),
the impact was soon after experienced in the real economy, as production,
consumption, growth and unemployment suffered significantly (Dewatripont et al.
2010). The detrimental effects of the economic crisis were particularly harsh for
countries in the EMU resulting in sovereign debt crisis for some nations.
Consequently, European policy makers have taken a number of unprecedented
measures. EU governments and the IMF provided low-interest loans- essentially a
bailout-to Greece, Ireland, and Portugal. The European Central Bank (ECB)
intervened by buying government securities on secondary markets (Buiter and
Rahbari 2010). In addition, the European Financial Stability Facility and the
European Financial Stabilization Mechanism2 were created to channel resources to
EU countries that should come to face fiscal difficulties in the future (Sibert 2010).
This paper contributes to the literature on the choice of an exchange rate regime by
answering the question whether expected bailout is a driving force in public support
for and opposition to joining a currency union. In particular, we use a unique
survey data to reveal if the recent actions of the EU governments and the ECB have
affected public attitude towards adopting the euro in Bulgaria.
The bailing out of Greece, Iceland, and Portugal has institutionalized the lender
of last resort (LOLR) in the European Central Bank (ECB) as well as other EU
governments, in particular Germany. When an enterprise, organization, or in this
case a country expects to be bailed during financial troubles, then the country will
face a soft-budget constraint (Korani 1986). As such the new institutionalization of
LOLR who provides a soft-budget constraint has reweighed the cost-benefit analysis
that is associated with joining the EMU for periphery countries which could
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inevitably distort countries’ (both in the Eurozone and in the periphery) action.
This institutionalization of LOLR gives rise to a moral hazard problem where
shielding a party from risk will invariably change its behavior compared to how it
would behave lacking security (Steigner 2004)22.
Having operated a currency board since its 1997 financial crisis, Bulgaria makes
an interesting case as it has a currency board with a peg to the euro that paves the
way for a relatively seamless transition to Eurozone membership. The currency
board was implemented after a severe financial crisis that caused extreme exchange
rate depreciation, hyperinflation, and the failure of many banks (see Dobrinsky
(2000) and Berlemann et al. (2002) for a detailed account)23. In addition, Bulgaria
has been a member of the European Union (EU) since 2007, and seemed bound to
join the European Monetary Union (EMU) with substantial public support.
However, the two recent developments- the current financial and economic crisis and
the bailing out of poorly performing EMU members (i.e. Greece, Ireland, and
Portugal) by better situated member countries (i.e. Germany) may have an
important impact on the decision to join the EMU. In particular, the crisis in
Greece, Bulgaria’s neighbor in the north, could be at least partially attributed to its
EMU membership, due to moral hazard, large capital inflows, and loss of
competitiveness. That lesson should make Eurozone membership less attractive. On
the other hand, the Greek bailout confirms that Eurozone countries in financial
22While the proponents of LOLR bail-outs argue that it may be efficient (Mishkin 1995),(San-
tomero and Hoffman 1998), (Freixas et al. 1998), many have criticized LOLR bailouts arguing that
bailouts distort incentives and leads to excessive risk taking entities (Goodfriend and King 1988),
(Bordo and Schwartz 2000).
23The 1997 crisis was the most sweeping episode of high inflation in Bulgaria but it was not the
first one. It was preceded by another period of high inflation and currency depreciation in 1994 and
by an earlier similar episode in 1991. Therefore, by 1997 Bulgarians had drawn the conclusion that
their central bank was not capable and/or is not allowed to manage monetary policy responsibly.
They gave overwhelming parliamentary majority to a political party that promised to eliminate
discretion over money supply by the law of he currency board. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that
the memories from the period preceding the currency board are characterized by financial instability
and monetary policy mismanagement.
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trouble would receive help, making membership in the EMU to be an insurance
mechanism. Thus, the signals are mixed.
Adopting the euro will move Bulgaria from a currency board to a currency
union, which is essentially a move from one type of fixed exchange rate system to
another fixed exchange rate regime. While such fixed exchange rate regime delivers
low inflation, it restricts monetary policy and eliminates monetary autonomy. If the
economy is growing the limits to stabilization policy are not a problem. However, a
large negative economic shock could induce a switch to a flexible exchange rate
regime as the benefits of expansionary policy become greater than the benefits of
low inflation. The greatest gain from adopting the euro in Bulgaria is to eliminate
the possibility of the collapse of the currency board, which will result in devaluation
with dire financial consequences. Furthermore, a large set of literature suggest
currency union reduces transaction costs thereby enhancing trade (Rose 2000),
(Frankel and Rose 2002), (Rose and Stanley 2005). Moreover, by adopting the
currency of a low-inflation country a higher inflation country can import credibility
(Herrendorf 1997), (Alesina et al. 2003). On the other hand the main cost of
adopting the euro instead of maintaining the currency board is the loss of
seignorage and the loss of monetary policy autonomy, not to mention the costs
associated with the conversion to the euro which can be substantial. Therefore, in
face of economic hardship and in light of the recent events in the Eurozone,
Bulgaria needs to reevaluate its pursuit of membership into the EMU.
We explore whether the dynamics of bailouts have affected the attitude about
the euro in Bulgaria. We use survey data from Bulgaria collected at the height of
economic hardship during the recent economic slowdown. The survey is uniquely
useful for our purposes as it asks respondents about expected costs and benefits
from adopting the euro. In addition, the survey also inquires about the perceived
gains and losses that the neighboring country Greece had to withstand due to its
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membership in the EMU. The literature offers multiple analyses on the macro level
investigating the determinants of exchange rate policy (Edwards (1996), Szapary
and Jakab (1998), Guobing (2003),Hagen and Zhou (2004)). However, the
advantage of the micro-level analysis is that it allows us to investigate the
heterogeneity within a country. Another advantage of using the survey data is that
it allows us to examine whether the costs and benefits of adopting the euro as
calculated by economists are the same as those expected by the population.
The survey results show that the global financial crisis as well as the problems
with the euro itself has not eliminated the willingness of periphery countries to enter
the Eurozone. Although the problems in Greece have highlighted the shortcomings
of the euro the recent bailout of countries in the Eurozone have strengthened the
perception that the Eurozone acts as an “insurance mechanism”. Even though
respondents expect the euro to have a negative effect on their personal economic
situation as well as that of the average Bulgarian households, they continue to
support the adoption of the euro with the expectation that if Bulgaria is part of the
currency union it would likely receive help in times of economic difficulties. We also
find that support for the Eurozone membership is strongly driven by the degree of
trust people have in the EU and Bulgarian institutions. Moreover, we find that
younger individuals are more likely to support entering the EMU.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section presents the
survey data. Section 3 discusses expected costs and benefits of adopting the euro in
Bulgaria. Section 4 provides empirical analysis and we conclude with final remarks
in section 5.
III.2 Survey Data
A currency board is a variation of a fixed exchange rate regime where the change in
money supply is linked to the balance of payments and the monetary authorities
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forgo discretionary control over the money supply. One important difference
between currency boards and a regular peg is that currency boards have a legal
framework. The rules and legal framework of the Bulgarian currency board are
written into the Law of the Bulgarian National Bank. Moreover, the central bank
maintains foreign exchange reserves that cover the entire monetary base and is
prohibited from lending to the government. Because of these features currency
boards are often difficult to revoke. Removing the currency board would require an
act of Parliament which makes this a much more political decision, a decision that
has to carry the support of the majority of political representatives. This is
important in our analysis because the survey data discussed probes the opinions of
the population. The legal framework of the currency board allows these opinions to
have direct influence on actual policy.
The paper uses data from a national household survey in Bulgaria administered
in February 2012, during a sever financial crisis and in the midst of the
administration of bailouts to Eurozone countries. The sample contains response
from 1006 individuals and its demographic structure in terms of age, education
level, income, and gender is representative of the population of 7.5 million. The
survey was carried out by a network of professional interviewers for Vitosha
Research, one of the major polling agencies in Bulgaria.24
The survey included the question which directly inquires about the support for
adopting the euro through the European Monetary Union (EMU). Specifically,
respondents were asked whether they believed the following statement was a very
good idea, a good idea, a bad idea, a very bad idea, or didn’t know:
Statement 1 : The adoption of the euro through the European Monetary Union
(EMU).
24The survey questionnaire and the data are available from the authors upon request.
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In addition respondents were asked about the economy-wide potential benefits
and costs of adopting the euro. In particular, respondents could respond whether
they thought certain macroeconomic variables would improve, not change,
deteriorate, or indicate that they did not know with EMU membership. The
macroeconomic variables stated were Price Stability, level of Output, level of
Exports, and Employment Rate. Furthermore, respondents were asked if they
expected an improvement, deterioration, or no change to the Economic Condition of
the Average Bulgarian as well as their Own Personal Economic Situation or
indicate that they didn’t know. The distinction between personal economic
situation and that of the average Bulgarian is motivated by the political science
literature, which studies the effect of economic conditions on voting. Kinder and
Kiewiet (1979) and Kinder and Kiewiet (1981) find that voting decision in the
United States are influenced primarily by national economic conditions and much
less by individual economic circumstances. As such the differentiation in the survey
questions will enable us to observe if there is a sociotropic or egocentric voting trend
in Bulgaria vis− a`− vis the adoption of the euro.
The questions of primary interest, Bulgarians’ perceptions about the advantage
of joining the EMU after the recent global financial crisis as well as the role of the
euro in the recent crisis in Greece, were asked in the survey through several
questions. Respondents could answer that they strongly agreed, agreed, neither
agreed nor disagreed, disagreed, strongly disagreed, or didn’t know to the following
statements:
Statement 2 : Membership in the EMU is an insurance mechanism, it may cost
money, but a country can receive financial help if it needs it.
Statement 3 : If the country is a member of the EMU, it could borrow more because
it would receive the help from the Union in case it cannot pay it back.
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Statement 4 : The problems in Greece are more difficult because Greece uses the
euro.
Statement 5 : Greece receives financial help from European countries because they
are part of the Eurozone.
Statement 2 and Statement 3 reveal the perceived benefits of adopting the euro
after Bulgarians have observed country members of the European Monetary Union
serving as lenders of resorts for economically troubled countries in the union.
Statements 4 and 5 are an attempt to gauge how much Bulgarians believe that the
troubles that have been plaguing Greece could be attributed to the use of the euro
in Greece, as well as the benefits that Greece has received as a member of the EMU
(i.e. bailouts from Germany).
Next we present a summary of the survey results. In section 4 we use
demographic variables along answer to Statements 2-5 to investigate the effect of
the perceived costs and benefits of adopting the euro on respondents’ preferences
over currency policy.
III.3 Expected Benefits and Costs of Adopting the Euro
As a member of the European Union (EU) with a pending membership to the EMU,
Bulgarians have witnessed the potential benefits and costs associated with the euro
through the current global financial crisis and subsequent euro crisis. As such the
effects of the violation of the Maasticht Treaty with regards to bailing-out highly
indebted EMU countries plays an important role in Bulgarians’ expectations about
the gains and cost of the EMU membership. Table 12 reports Bulgarians’ view
about the purpose of membership in the EMU beyond potential stability of prices
and/or output. The variable of interest, the view of EMU membership serving as an
insurance mechanism, has a support of 58 percent of the respondents with an
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opinion 25. In addition, about 45 percent of Bulgarians either strongly agree or
agree to Statement 3, indicating that membership in the EMU is believed to allow
Bulgaria to borrow more as a member state than it could otherwise as a lone
standing country because lenders will be willing to lend to any country at high
interest rate taking into account that Europe would refund the debt should the
country fail. Furthermore, if a country is able to borrow more the government
would be able to increase its public spending potentially improving employment in
the country. Therefore, it is safe to say that Bulgarians believe that membership in
the EMU could be a shelter from crisis and a source for more funds from investors,
potentially leading to a moral hazard problem.
On the other hand, the problems experienced in Greece and other countries that
utilize the euro should be a deterrent from adopting the euro as we have seen
countries struggle to recover from the global financial crisis. The inability to devalue
their currency due to the lack of an autonomous central bank has forced countries
such as Greece, Iceland, and Spain to adopt severe austerity measures. Specifically,
Greece had to implement steep tax increases, severe government spending cuts, civil
service job cuts, and make its economy competitive by cutting the cost of doing
business in Greece. Yet as can be seen from Table 12, Bulgarians do not blame the
economic hardships of their neighboring country Greece on the adoption of the euro.
In fact, 53 percent of the respondents with an opinion do not associate Greece’s
economic problems with membership in the EMU. Moreover, the belief that the
Eurozone serves as an insurance mechanism among Bulgarians is reiterated by the
fact that of the respondents who provided an opinion, about 68 percent either
strongly agree or agreed with Statement 4, indicating that they believe that due to
its membership in the EMU, Greece receives financial assistance from its fellow
union countries which it could not have had otherwise.
25Respondents that have an opinion are those who didn’t respond “neither agree nor disagree”
and “I don’t know”. They either strongly agreed, agreed, disagreed, or strongly disagreed.
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Table 13 presents the percent of survey respondents who declared support for or
opposition to the adoption of the euro. About 6 percent of the respondents did not
express an opinion regarding the adoption of the euro. Of those who did provide
their opinion, there are about 43 percent supporting adopting the euro. The
relatively high support for the adoption of the euro is surprising; especially given
that many of the respondents do not expect much gain in terms of macroeconomic
improvement through the adoption of the euro. Table 14 shows the expected
benefits and costs associated with adopting the euro. The greatest expected benefit
associated with adopting the euro is in exports; 32 percent of the respondents with
an opinion believe that exports will increase with the adoption of the euro
indicating that by joining the EMU trade is expected to increase as pointed out in
the finance literature. Another important expected benefit from adopting the euro
is an increase in overall production, with 27 percent of respondents expecting overall
production improvement.
In opposition, the highest expected cost of the adoption of the euro is associated
with price stability. An overwhelming 46 percent of the respondents with opinion
believe that price stability will deteriorate with the adoption of the euro. With fixed
exchange rate there is a concern of importing inflation; unlike a floating exchange
rate, a country can’t appreciate or depreciate its currency in order to not be affected
by rising import prices (Edwards 1996). In addition, a very large percentage of the
respondents were concerned that adopting the euro will deteriorate their own
economic standing as well as other Bulgarian citizens. Only 21 percent of
respondents answered that they would experience personal benefit from the
adoption of the euro, while 40 percent answered that they would be hurt by the
adoption of the euro. Furthermore, while another 33 percent believed that the
adoption of the euro would have no effect on them, 6 percent answered that they
did not know what kind of effect joining the EMU would have. Expectations of
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national cost are well aligned with the expected personal costs associated with
adopting the euro. Indeed, of those who responded, 23 of the respondents expected
benefits at the national level, 23 percent expected no change, and 42 percent
expected costs on the national level associated with the adoption of the euro.
Clearly, even though Bulgarians do not expect gains from adopting the euro both
at the personal and national level, they support joining the EMU. However, there is
an expected benefit of insurance and the ability to borrow more as demonstrated
through the bail-out benefits that Greece has received from its EMU counterparts.
III.4 Explaining the Support for the Adoption of the Euro
In order to see if Bulgarians adapt their expected cost and benefit analysis based on
recent events in the Eurozone, we investigate the determinants of support for the
adoption of the euro using demographic variables as well as several variables based
on the question discussed above. Table 15 presents the estimated results of probit
models with the dependent variable being a dummy variable that equals 1 if a
respondent believe that adopting the euro is either a good idea or a very good idea,
and zero otherwise. We report the marginal effects from the probit estimations
instead of the estimated coefficients, which makes the interpretation of the
quantitative effects more straightforward2627.
The explanatory variable of primary interest in this paper is based on the
question about expected bailouts or the insurance mechanism associated with
adopting the euro. Similar to the dependent variable, we construct a dummy
variable Insurance, which equals 1 if a respondent either agreed or strongly agreed
that membership in the EMU serves as an insurance mechanism, and zero otherwise
for the estimations. In the same manner we create dummy variables Borrowing
Capacity, Difficulty in Greece, and Financial help to Greece, which equal 1 if a
26Estimated marginal effects are calculated at the mean of the independent variable.
27Estimated coefficients for the probit models are found in Appendix C.
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respondent either agreed or strongly agreed to Statements 3-5 respectively, and zero
otherwise.
The variable Insurance measures respondents’ view that joining the EMU will
serve as an insurance mechanism. When Germany and the ECB violated the
Maastricht Treaty and bailed out Greece and other struggling member countries, in
essence they created a precedent for other countries to potentially be bailed out in
times of financial difficulty. Such a precedent would allow countries like Bulgaria to
consider the benefit of having a soft-budget constraint through potential bailouts in
their decision to join the EMU.
The variable Borrowing Capacity reflects respondents’ expectation that joining
the EMU implies that Bulgaria will be able to borrow more. The increased ability
to borrow knowing that there will be help if a country cannot pay back would allow
the Bulgarian government to borrow more than it could have if it was functioning
outside the parameter of the EMU. Because more funds available will lead to more
government spending, we expect the ability to borrow more would increase the
support for the adoption of the euro. The support for joining the EMU for bailout
purposes is further re-iterated by the variable Financial Help to Greece, which
reaffirms the fact that respondents do believe that the EMU does provide help for
its member countries as demonstrated through its actions towards Greece during
the financial crisis. While the Greek bailout confirms that Eurozone countries in
financial trouble would receive help, the problems in Greece could be attributed to
its EMU membership induced by moral hazard, large capital inflows, and loss of
competitiveness. Through Difficulty in Greece, we measure Bulgarians’ awareness
and expected negative impact of adopting the euro through the anecdotal case of
Greece.
In each of the equations reported in Table 15 we include other control variables
which are of interest as well. We enter a variable for education equal to 1 if a
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respondent had higher education and 0 otherwise, a variable for gender equal to 1
for male respondents and 0 for male respondents, income in terms of income groups,
and age in number of years. Respondents’ level of education can be thought of as a
proxy for how informed respondents are about the economy. The effect of education
is ambiguous. One could argue that removing the currency board and the ensuing
the adoption of the euro would give a boost to economic activity through increased
trade with Europe. However, joining a currency union could also be detrimental
with the country having no monetary autonomy to adjust to its own business cycles.
Thus, the opinion of an informed person is difficult to predict. V is− a`− vis the
variable age, older respondents may have stronger memories of the pre-currency
board financial instability and may therefore be more supportive of moving from a
currency board to another fixed exchange rate regime. The currency board was
implemented 13 years before the survey and many younger people have no personal
knowledge of the pre-crisis experience. In the same token, individuals with higher
income might have a greater stake in preserving financial stability.
In the first column of Table 15 the equation reported includes the variable
Insurance, which captures the effect of the expected insurance benefits on the
support for the adoption of euro, and demographic variables. In addition to the
variable Insurance and demographics, the equations reported in the second column
of Table 15 includes two additional variables describing expected benefits from the
adoption of the euro. Namely, these variables are National benefits, which equals 1 if
a respondent believes that adopting the euro will improve the economic situation of
the average Bulgarian, and 0 otherwise and the variable Personal benefits, which
equals 1 if a respondent believes that adopting the euro will improve his own
personal economic status, and 0 otherwise. These two variables enable us to
compare the relative effects of personal versus national effects on the support for the
adoption of the euro.
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The third column includes the variable Borrowing Capacity, National benefits,
Personal benefits and demographic variables, while column four and five include the
variables Difficulty in Greece and Financial help, respectively instead of Borrowing
Capacity in addition to the same variables as in column three. Finally, column six
of Table 15 includes both Insurance and Borrowing Capacity with expected national
and personal benefits, while controlling for education, age, gender, and income.
The results in Table 15 show that respondents’ belief that the EMU serves as an
insurance mechanism increases the support for the adoption of the euro,
emphasizing the fact that potential bailouts makes the EMU more attractive 28.
The expected benefits of joining the EMU are further re-enforced through the
positive and significant effect of expected increase in borrowing capacity with lower
possibility of default on the support for the adoption of the euro. The significant
positive relationship associated with insurance and borrowing with regards to the
support for moving from a currency board to a currency union suggest that the
perceived expected benefits of an insurance mechanism outweigh the economic
hardships that come from not stimulating output through devaluation, especially
during the current severe recession.
In addition, the perception of both national and personal benefits of adopting
the euro has a positive and statistically significant effect on support for joining the
EMU. The results highlight that respondents who perceive national benefits and
personal benefits from adopting the euro are more likely to support it. The sizes of
the marginal effects suggest a strong effect of the expected national benefits as
compared to personal benefits. In fact, the marginal effect of National Benefits is
more than twice larger than the marginal effects of Personal Benefits. As such it is
clear to observe that there is a more sociotropic (instead of egocentric) voting trend
in Bulgaria with regards to the adoption of the euro.
28We observe the same positive and statistically significant effects when we exclude “I don’t know”
responses.
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The estimates for the variables associated with the crisis in Greece, Difficulty
Greece and Financial help to Greece, have a statistically significant effect on the
support for adopting the euro. The results in Table 15 show that Bulgarians
understand the problems that Greece is facing by having its hands tied through
membership in the EMU. In fact respondents who perceive that the woes of Greece
are associated with Greece’s membership in the EMU are about 18 percent less
likely to support the adoption of the Euro. Moreover, the positive and significant
marginal effect of Financial help to Greece confirm the expected assistance among
Bulgarians as a member country of the EMU based on the actions of the richer
EMU member countries towards Greece during its troubled times.
The results also suggest that older respondents are more likely to support
adopting the euro in each of the specifications. This result could be explained by a
lack of trust in an independent monetary authority (central bank) by older
respondents based on negative past experience with discretionary monetary policy.
As such the older generation is less willing to support policy changes that do not tie
the hands of the central bank despite economic hardship.
In Table 16 we add two more variables related to credibility in all the four
specifications. The first variable, Trust in EU Institutions, takes on the value of 1 if
respondents believe that you can trust the European Union institutions. It
measures the confidence in the infrastructure surrounding the euro. The second
variable, Trust in Bulgarian Institutions, constructed in a similar manner measures
the credibility of Bulgarian institutions. In the fourth column of Table 16 we also
add variables associated with national and personal costs of adopting the euro. The
variable National Cost equals 1 if a respondent expects the economic situation of the
average Bulgarian to deteriorate, and zero otherwise. The variable Personal Cost is
constructed in the same way, if a respondent expects his own personal economic
status to deteriorate then the variable takes on the value of 1, and zero otherwise.
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The purpose of including these variables is to test for asymmetries of the perceived
costs and benefits of adopting the euro (i.e. whether perceived costs would lead to
stronger support for the adoption of the euro as opposed to the perceived benefits).
The results reported in Table 16 echo the results in Table 15 in that the variable
Insurance is positive and statistically significant implying that the perception of
EMU as a safety net leads to greater support for the adoption of the euro.
Additionally, older respondent are still in support of adopting the euro even after we
control for credibility of institutions and perceived gains and losses associated with
the adoption of the euro. We also observe that that if the population has more trust
in European institutions then they are about 20 percent more likely to support the
adoption of the euro, similar to the scenario of having more trust in Bulgarian
institutions albeit smaller marginal effects. It appears that Bulgarians believe in the
credibility of the euro and the European Central Bank (ECB) implying that the
euro and its institutions has expected stability associated with it. Furthermore, the
positive and significant effect associated with Trust in Bulgarian Institutions
demonstrates Bulgarians’ support of their government’s policy which is to join the
EMU 29. Moreover, the estimated results in the fourth specification of Table 16
show that the perception of national and personal cost of adopting the euro has a
statistically significant negative effect on support for adopting the euro 30.
In order to check for the robustness of the results presented in the previous
tables we utilize different estimation methods, the results of which are reported in
Table 17. In the first and second column we have estimated ordered probit models,
where the dependent variable takes five values ranging from 1 which indicates
29Bulgaria’s entry in to the Eurozone, initially scheduled for 2010, has been set back for some
time around 2012-2013. The entry is conditional on continued fiscal prudence and lower inflation.
30We also estimate models controlling for expected costs and benefits of adopting the euro V is−
a`−vis macroeconomic indicators, namely price, output, employment, and exports. The results show
that the expected gains in relation to adopting the euro lead to more support for the adoption of
the euro, while expected costs result in less support for the adoption of the euro. Most importantly,
even controlling for macroeconomic indicators the support for adopting the euro still increases with
perceived insurance mechanism among respondents.
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strong support to adopting the euro to 5 which indicates strong opposition for the
adoption of the euro31. However, for the variable of interest, Insurance, we construct
two versions for the estimations. In column (1) we use a dummy variable that equal
1 if a respondent either agreed or strongly agreed that joining the EMU serves an
insurance mechanism, and zero otherwise. In column (2) we use a variable that
ranges from 1 (strongly believe that EMU serves as an insurance mechanism) to 5
(do not believe that EMU serves as an insurance mechanism). The advantage of the
ordered probit estimations compared to the probit model is that they utilize more of
the variation in the data. However, the sizes of the estimated effects are not as
directly obvious as in the probit model. Equally important, about 5 percent of the
respondents answered that they could not provide an opinion on the preference to
adopt the euro. As such in column (3) of Table 17 we implement the Heckman
(1979) estimation method to correct for self-selection bias. The dependent variable
equals 1 if respondents support the adoption of the euro, and zero otherwise.
Similarly, the variable of interest, Insurance, takes on the value of 1 if EMU is
perceived to serve as an insurance mechanism, and zero otherwise.
The estimations of the first specification, an ordered probit methodology with a
dependent variable that takes five different values, show that respondents who
perceive EMU to be an insurance mechanism are more likely to support the
adoption of the euro. The coefficient estimate on this effect is highly statistically
significant. The direction of the effect and its statistical significance is confirmed in
column (2) where we use the dummy dependent variable but we switch to the
insurance variable that takes five different values. In this model, a one-step increase
in perception of insurance leads to about 12 percentage points greater support for
the adoption of the euro. Finally, in the last column we report the estimation of a
Heckman selection model where we estimate jointly the decision to give an answer
31For the specification of the ordered probit model refer to Appendix C.
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to the question about currency policy and the determinants of the support for the
adoption of the euro. The motivation for estimating this model is that the decision
to give an answer might be correlated with the decision to give a particular answer.
Therefore, not accounting for the former might bias the estimation of the latter.
Whether or not this concern for a selection bias is justified is indicated by the
significance of ρ, the correlation coefficient of the standard errors from the two
equations. In our case, the correlation coefficient is not statistically significant
indicating that selection bias is not an issue. Furthermore, the insurance variable is
positive and significant, indicating that support for the adoption of the euro
increases by 39 percent if the EMU is considered to be a safety net. Looking at the
remaining explanatory variables, we observe that age, trust in EU institutions, and
trust in Bulgarian institutions, as well as expected benefits vis− a`− vis output,
employment, and price are indeed associated with greater support for adopting the
euro.
III.5 Final Remarks
Bulgaria currently has a currency board pegging the local currency to the euro
putting it one step away from adopting the euro. As one of the new EU member
states, Bulgaria has to decide whether to press for the Eurozone membership.
According to macroeconomic theory, however, the path to Eurozone membership
should be less appealing due the recent global financial crisis. A move from a
currency board to a currency union (a move from a peg to another peg) would be
less beneficial for Bulgaria than say a devaluation which will enable it to stimulate
economic activity.
However, despite economic hardship as experienced by its neighboring country of
Greece associated with the use of the euro, we find that the desire to enter the
Eurozone has not decreased in Bulgaria. On one hand, the problems in Greece could
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be attributed to its EMU membership due to moral hazard, large capital inflows,
and loss of competitiveness. That lesson should make European Monetary Union
membership less attractive. On the other hand, the Greek bailout confirms that
Eurozone countries in financial trouble would receive help. Thus, the signals are
mixed.
The survey data analyzed in this paper reveals that there exists a strong support
for the adoption of the euro among Bulgarians. The survey shows that the
population expects the euro to have a relatively negative impact on various
macroeconomic indicators and their own personal economic situation as well as the
economic situation of the average household. These expectations work to lower the
support for EMU membership. However, a large fraction of the population views
the EMU as an insurance mechanism. They believe that if Bulgaria is part of the
Eurozone and experiences financial difficulties it would receive help, as epitomize by
the anecdotal case of Greece. That perception has a strong positive impact on
people’s attitude toward adopting the euro.
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Table 12: Problems and Benefits Associated with Membership in EMU
EMU EMU Problems Greece receives
membership membership in Greece financial ass.
means receive means borrow are associated because of
financial ass. more with the Euro EMU
Strongly Agree 19.58 9.05 9.74 30.02
Agree 47.32 36.08 16.00 45.13
Neither Agree 10.14 11.33 5.67 5.37
nor Disagree
Disagree 14.51 26.84 41.65 10.93
Strongly Disagree 5.57 9.54 19.48 4.08
I don’t know 2.88 7.16 7.46 4.47
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Notes:The numbers of the table are percent of the total by type of response.
Statement 2: Membership in the EMU is an insurance mechanism, it may cost money,
but a country can receive financial help if it needs it.
Statement 3: If the country is a member of the EMU, it could borrow more because
it would receive the help from the Union in case it cannot pay it back.
Statement 4: The problems in Greece are more difficult because Greece uses the euro.
Statemetn 5: Greece receives financial help form European countries because they are
part of the Eurozone.
Table 13: Support for Adoption of the
Euro in Bulgaria
Adopting the Euro
Very good idea 12.0
Good idea 33.0
Bad idea 37.9
Very bad idea 11.6
I don’t know 5.5
Total 100.0
Notes: The numbers of the table are per-
cent of the total by type of response.
73
Table 14: Expected Effects on Macroeconomic Indicators from Adopting the Euro in
Bulgaria
Economic
Situation
Price of Avg. Personal
Stability Output Employment Exports Bulgarian Income
Will Improve 24.65 31.41 27.93 37.48 24.06 21.07
No Change 15.81 27.63 28.73 24.25 24.75 32.9
Will Deteriorate 51.09 28.63 31.71 23.16 44.93 40.36
I don’t know 8.45 12.33 11.63 15.11 6.26 5.67
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Notes: The numbers of the table are percent of the total by type of response.
Table 15: Support for the Adoption of the Euro (part 1)
Dependent variable: 1 if adopting the euro is a good/very good idea, 0 otherwise
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Insurance 0.277*** 0.237*** 0.227***
(0.0328) (0.0347) (0.0351)
Borrow 0.179***
(0.0348)
Greece problems -0.190*** -0.176***
(0.0372) (0.0380)
Financial help 0.0776*
(0.0403)
National benefits 0.350*** 0.365*** 0.363*** 0.368*** 0.345***
(0.0513) (0.0498) (0.0501) (0.0492) (0.0521)
Personal benefits 0.114* 0.112* 0.128** 0.129** 0.113*
(0.0607) (0.0607) (0.0607) (0.0596) (0.0615)
Education -0.0306 -0.0140 0.00564 0.00637 0.00169 -0.0113
(0.0344) (0.0362) (0.0361) (0.0359) (0.0358) (0.0364)
Male 0.0206 0.0213 0.0203 0.0264 0.0309 0.0179
(0.0341) (0.0357) (0.0357) (0.0355) (0.0353) (0.0360)
Age 0.0282** 0.0355*** 0.0413*** 0.0344*** 0.0374*** 0.0351***
(0.0112) (0.0119) (0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0120)
Income 0.00120 0.00159 0.00174 0.00139 0.00163 0.00133
(0.00141) (0.00140) (0.00143) (0.00139) (0.00139) (0.00140)
Model Chi2(7) 67.15 155.12 146.96 143.83 129.66 163.98
Number of Obs. 904 904 904 904 904 904
Notes: The reported coefficients in columns (1)-(6) are marginal effects. Standard errors in paren-
thesis. ***(**,*) indicates statistical significance at the 1 (5,10) percent level.
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Table 16: Support for the Adoption of the Euro (part 2)
Dependent variable: 1 if adopting the euro is a good/very good
idea, 0 otherwise
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Insurance 0.179*** 0.217*** 0.165*** 0.165***
(0.0377) (0.0356) (0.0382) (0.0386)
National benefits 0.348*** 0.342*** 0.342*** 0.251***
(0.0518) (0.0519) (0.0524) (0.0604)
Personal benefits 0.0948 0.115* 0.0966 0.0460
(0.0617) (0.0610) (0.0620) (0.0641)
National costs -0.137***
(0.0505)
Personal costs -0.109**
(0.0504)
Trust in EU institutions 0.206*** 0.195*** 0.183***
(0.0384) (0.0390) (0.0400)
Trust in Bulgarian Institutions 0.127*** 0.106** 0.109***
(0.0404) (0.0412) (0.0418)
Education -0.0235 -0.0136 -0.0226 -0.0127
(0.0368) (0.0363) (0.0368) (0.0372)
Male 0.0140 0.0202 0.0130 0.0119
(0.0362) (0.0358) (0.0363) (0.0366)
Age 0.0407*** 0.0315*** 0.0371*** 0.0343***
(0.0120) (0.0121) (0.0122) (0.0123)
Income 0.00190 0.00143 0.00173 0.00169
(0.00141) (0.00140) (0.00142) (0.00140)
Model Chi2(7) 175.92 160.39 178.99 201.84
Number of Obs. 904 904 904 904
Notes: The reported coefficients in columns (1)-(4) are marginal effects. Standard errors in
parenthesis. ***(**,*) indicates statistical significance at the 1 (5,10) percent level.
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Table 17: Support for the Adoption of the Euro (Ordered Probit and Probit with Sample
Selection Analysis)
Dep. variable:takes on Dep. variable: takes on
values 1-9 values 1 or 0,
Insurance Insurance Heckman Selection
takes on values 1 or 0 takes values 1-9 Model
(1) (2) (3)
Insurance -0.377*** 0.120*** 0.393***
(0.0766) (0.0267) (0.0982)
National benefits -0.631*** -0.646*** 0.916***
(0.119) (0.118) (0.150)
Personal benefits -0.304** -0.285** 0.167
(0.119) (0.118) (0.155)
Trust in EU -0.336*** -0.338*** 0.482***
(0.0776) (0.0782) (0.0977)
Institutions
(0.0776) (0.0782) (0.0977)
Trust in Bulgarian -0.151* -0.166** 0.256**
Institutions
(0.0839) (0.0840) (0.0999)
Education -0.0562 -0.0441 -0.0665
(0.0734) (0.0741) (0.0914)
Male -0.0904 -0.0887 -0.0279
(0.0721) (0.0723) (0.0903)
Age -0.0550** -0.0619** 0.111***
(0.0242) (0.0242) (0.0299)
Income -0.00111 -0.00114 0.00451
(0.00315) (0.00299) (0.00349)
Constant (cut1) -2.448*** -1.922*** -1.455***
(0.182) (0.194) (0.202)
Constant (cut2) -1.215*** -0.691***
(0.164) (0.178)
Constatn (cut 3) -0.0114 0.516***
(0.154) (0.174)
Constant (cut 4) 0.669*** 1.203***
(0.152) (0.177)
Participation equation. Dependent variable: 1 if a respondent
provided an answer, 0 otherwise
Age -0.0288
(0.0453)
Education 0.0454
(0.142)
Male 0.218
(0.140)
Income -0.00130
(0.00511)
High Social Status 0.236*
(0.136)
Constant 1.511***
(0.285)
(1.675)
Model Chi2(9) 180.40 175.06 177.30
Wald test of ind Eq. 0.4840
Prob>chi2
Number of Obs. 904 904 904
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) report coefficient estimates of an ordered probit model. Column (3) reports
the coefficients of a Heckman selection (probit)model. Standard errors in parenthesis. ***(**,*) indicates
statistical significance at the 1 (5,10) percent level.
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Table 18: Exchange Rate Regime Classification, Reinhart and Rogoff (2004)
Regime Coarse Grid
No Separate legal tender 1
Pre announced peg or currency 1
board arrangement
Pre announced horizontal band 1
that is narrower than or equal
to + \−2%
De facto peg 1
Pre announced crawling peg 2
Pre announced crawling band 2
that is narrower than or equal
to +\−2%
De facto crawling peg 2
De facto crawling band that is 2
narrower than or equal to
+\−2%
Pre announced crawling peg that 3
is narrower than or equal to
+\−5%
Moving band that is narrower than 3
or equal to +\−2%
(i.e. allows for both appreciation
and depreciation over time)
Managed floating 3
Freely floating 4
Freely falling 5
Dual market in which 6
parallel market data is missing
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Table 19: Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics
Source Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Reinhart and Rogoff RR Classification 4390 2.258 1.310 1.000 6.000
(2004)
Peg 4390 0.652 0.476 0.000 1.000
Exit from a Peg 4242 0.024 0.154 0.000 1.000
WDI, World Bank Growth (annual %) 4561 3.835 6.474 -51.031 106.280
WDI, World Bank Inflation (% CPI) 4116 39.314 475.896 -100.000 24411.030
WDI, World Bank Current Account 3766 -3.012 9.661 -240.496 56.698
Balance
WDI, World Bank Openness 4537 69.870 40.448 0.309 438.092
WDI, World Bank Claims on Government 4439 10.941 22.851 -86.547 272.697
(% GDP)
WDI, World Bank REER 2068 3747.840 132249.600 26.821 5965760.000
WDI, World Bank Reserves 4575 9.90e9 4.85e10 -628535.5 1.53e12
(minus gold)
Lane and Milesi- Net Foreign Asset 4643 -8377.156 137769.500 -2359118.000 2180352.000
Ferreti(2007)
WDI, World Bank Employment (%) 1707 99.016 3.952 43.500 102.500
WDI, World Bank Unemployment (%) 1796 8.896 5.789 0.154 39.285
WDI, World Bank Credit (domestic) 4576 1.41e13 1.06e14 −1.34e12 1.60e15
Polity IV Project Political Rights 4902 0.858 7.470 -10.000 10.000
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Table 20: Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics for National Survey,
Bulgaria 2010
Variables Definition No. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Support currency 1 if a respondent strongly 646 0.56 0.50 0 1
board disagrees or disagrees
with statement 1,
0 otherwise
Uncertain if a respondent strongly 646 0.76 0.43 0 1
disagrees or
disagrees with statement 3,
0 otherwise
Education 1 if respondent 646 0.29 0.45 0 1
has a high school
education or higher,
0 otherwise
Male 1 if a respondent is male, 646 0.46 0.50 0 1
0 for female
Age age of respondent 646 5.14 1.83 1.8 9.9
Income Income group 533 6.71 3.00 1 11
of the individual
Unemployed 1 if a respondent is 646 0.13 0.34 0 1
unemployed,0 otherwise
Risk averse 1 if respondent agrees 646 0.68 0.47 0 1
or strongly agrees
with the statement,
“one should wear
seatbelts while
driving”, 0 otherwise
Statement 1: I would support removing the currency board and moving towards a
float.
Statement 3: It is very difficult to predict what the inflation rate would be if we
remove the currency board.
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Ordered Probit Model Specification Utilized in Table 10 and Table 11
The variable to be modeled is a an observed and coded discrete response
variable, yi which takes on J(J = 6) different values, which are naturally ordered.
yi =

1 (StronglyAgree)
2 (Agree)
3 (NeitherAgreenorDisagree)
4 (Disagree)
5 (StronglyDisagree)
9 (Idon′tknow)
where i = 1, 2, ...., n.
As with the probit model we assume that the observed yi is generated by a
latent variable y∗i . y
∗
i is then given by
y∗i = x
′β + i
where β is a vector of parameters to be estimated and i is a random error term
(assumed to follow a standard normal distribution).
The link between the latent and observed data is then given as follows:
yi =

1 if −∞ ≤ y∗i ≤ α1
2 if α1 < y
∗
i ≤ α2
3 if α2 < y
∗
i ≤ α3
4 if α3 < y
∗
i ≤ α4
5 if α4 < y
∗
i ≤ α5
9 if α5 < y
∗
i ≤ ∞
where the αi represent thresholds (cut points) to be estimated.
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Table 21: Support for Currency Board
Dependent Variable: Support for currency board
(1) (2) (3)
Uncertain 0.643*** 0.845*** 0.228***
(0.134) (0.103) (0.0655)
Education 0.189 0.389*** 0.182
(0.138) (0.124) (0.137)
Male 0.101 0.131 0.0960
(0.116) (0.0982) (0.116)
Age 0.152*** 0.119*** 0.152***
(0.0352) (0.0298) (0.0349)
Income 0.0526** 0.0813*** 0.0517**
(0.0219) (0.0188) (0.0218)
Unemployed -0.0962 -0.0311 -0.0992
(0.173) (0.150) (0.173)
Riskaverse 0.390*** 0.279*** 0.406***
(0.122) (0.104) (0.121)
Constant -1.855*** -2.348*** -2.253***
(0.322) (0.265) (0.405)
Number of Obs. 533 809 533
The reported estimates are coefficients of a probit model.
Standard errors in parenthesis. ***(**, *) indicates statistical significance at the 1
(5,10) percent level.
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Table 22: Support for Political Party Maintaining the Currency
Board
Dependent Variable: Support for pro-Currency Board Political Party
(1) (2) (3)
Uncertain 0.638*** 0.891*** 0.213***
(0.135) (0.101) (0.0652)
Education 0.418*** 0.505*** 0.405***
(0.143) (0.127) (0.142)
Male 0.0666 0.0704 0.0624
(0.119) (0.0981) (0.118)
Age 0.125*** 0.0828*** 0.125***
(0.0360) (0.0294) (0.0356)
Income 0.0611*** 0.0861*** 0.0598***
(0.0223) (0.0185) (0.0222)
Unemployed -0.00863 0.0104 -0.0157
(0.174) (0.146) (0.176)
Riskaverse 0.432*** 0.313*** 0.448***
(0.123) (0.103) (0.122)
Constant -1.712*** -2.074*** -2.054***
(0.329) (0.261) (0.408)
Number of Obs. 533 809 533
The reported estimates are coefficients of a probit model.
Standard errors in parenthesis. ***(**, *) indicates statistical signif-
icance at the 1 (5,10) percent level.
Appendix C
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER III
Table 23: Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics for National Survey, Bulgaria 2012
Variables Definition No. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Support for adoption of 1 if respondents believe adopting 1006 0.45 0.50 0 1
the euro the euro is a very good or good
idea, 0 otherwise
Insurance 1 if a respondent strongly disagrees 1006 0.67 0.47 0 1
or disagrees with statement 2,
0 otherwise
Borrowing Capacity 1 if a respondent strongly disagrees 1006 0.45 0.50 0 1
or disagrees with statement 3,
0 otherwise
Difficulties in Greece 1 if a respondent strongly disagrees 1006 0.26 0.44 0 1
or disagrees with statement 4,
0 otherwise
Financial Help 1 if a respondent strongly disagrees 1006 0.75 0.43 0 1
or disagrees with statement 5,
0 otherwise
National Benefits 1 if respondents believe adopting 1006 0.24 0.43 0 1
the euro will improve the
economic situation of the avergage
Bulgarian, 0 otherwise
Personal Benefits 1 if respondents believe adopting 1006 0.21 0.41 0 1
the euro will improve their
personal income, 0 otherwise
National Costs 1 if respondents believe adopting 1006 0.45 0.50 0 1
the euro will deteriorate the
economic situation of the avergage
Bulgarian, 0 otherwise
Personal Costs 1 if respondents believe adopting 1006 0.40 0.49 0 1
the euro will deteriorate their
personal income, 0 otherwise
Trust in EU 1 if respondents strongly agree or 1006 0.68 0.47 0 1
Institutions agree that one can trust EU
Institutions, 0 otherwise
Trust in Bulgrian 1 if respondents strongly agree or 1006 0.28 0.45 0 1
Institutions agree that one can trust Bulgarian
Institutions, 0 otherwise
Education 1 if respondent has a high school 1006 0.41 0.49 0 1
education or higher,
0 otherwise
Male 1 if a respondent is male, 1006 0.47 0.50 0 1
0 for female
Age age of respondent 1006 50.00 15.90 18 99
Income Income group of the indvidual 905 9.38 12.60 1 97
High Social Status 1 if a respondent is in the top 2 1006 0.61 0.49 0 1
classification of social status,
0 otherwise
Statement 2: Membership in the EMU is an insurance mechanism, it may cost money, but a country can receive financial help
if it needs it.
Statement 3: If the country is a member of the EMU, it could borrow more because it would receive the help from the Union
in case it cannot pay it back.
Statement 4: The problems in Greece are more difficult because Greece uses the euro.
Statement 5: Greece receives financial help from European countries because they are part of the Eurozone.
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Ordered Probit Model Specification Utilized in Table 17
The variable to be modeled is a an observed and coded discrete response
variable, yi which takes on J(J = 5) different values, which are naturally ordered.
yi =

1 (V eryGoodIdea)
2 (GoodIdea)
3 (BadIdea)
4 (V eryBadIdea)
9 (Idon′tknow)
where i = 1, 2, ...., n.
As with the probit model we assume that the observed yi is generated by a
latent variable y∗i . y
∗
i is then given by
y∗i = x
′β + i
where β is a vector of parameters to be estimated and i is a random error term
(assumed to follow a standard normal distribution).
The link between the latent and observed data is then given as follows:
yi =

1 if −∞ ≤ y∗i ≤ α1
2 if α1 < y
∗
i ≤ α2
3 if α3 < y
∗
i ≤ α4
4 if α4 < y
∗
i ≤ α5
9 if α5 < y
∗
i ≤ ∞
where the αi represent thresholds (cut points) to be estimated.
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Table 24: Support for the Adoption of the Euro in Bulgaria
Dependent Variable: 1 if adopting the euro is a good/very good idea, 0 otherwise
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Insurance 0.731*** 0.617*** 0.593***
(0.0935) (0.0954) (0.0963)
Borrow 0.454***
(0.0897)
Greece problems -0.494*** -0.458***
(0.101) (0.103)
Financial help 0.197*
(0.104)
National benefit 0.913*** 0.958*** 0.952*** 0.968*** 0.899***
(0.148) (0.146) (0.147) (0.145) (0.149)
Personal benefit 0.288* 0.281* 0.322** 0.325** 0.285*
(0.153) (0.153) (0.154) (0.151) (0.155)
Education -0.0774 -0.0354 0.0142 0.0161 0.00427 -0.0286
(0.0872) (0.0914) (0.0909) (0.0907) (0.0903) (0.0920)
Male 0.0521 0.0538 0.0511 0.0666 0.0780 0.0453
(0.0862) (0.0901) (0.0900) (0.0897) (0.0891) (0.0908)
Age 0.0713** 0.0897*** 0.104*** 0.0869*** 0.0942*** 0.0887***
(0.0284) (0.0301) (0.0295) (0.0295) (0.0295) (0.0303)
Income 0.00303 0.00402 0.00438 0.00352 0.00411 0.00337
(0.00357) (0.00354) (0.00361) (0.00352) (0.00350) (0.00354)
Constant -1.002*** -1.323*** -1.211*** -0.801*** -1.120*** -1.178***
(0.184) (0.191) (0.185) (0.182) (0.201) (0.195)
Number of Obs. 904 904 904 904 904 904
The reported estimates are coefficients of a probit model.
Standard errors in parenthesis. ***(**, *) indicates statistical significance at the 1 (5,10)
percent level.
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Table 25: Support for the Adoption of the Euro in Bulgaria
Dependent Variable: 1 if adopting the euro is a good/very good idea, 0 otherwise
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Insurance 0.462*** 0.564*** 0.425*** 0.426***
(0.100) (0.0967) (0.101) (0.102)
National benefit 0.907*** 0.891*** 0.891*** 0.641***
(0.148) (0.148) (0.149) (0.160)
Persoal benefit 0.239 0.290* 0.243 0.116
(0.155) (0.154) (0.156) (0.161)
National costs -0.350***
(0.131)
Persoal costs -0.279**
(0.130)
Trust in EU institions 0.534*** 0.505*** 0.475***
(0.104) (0.105) (0.108)
Trust in Bulgarian Institutions 0.321*** 0.266** 0.275***
(0.102) (0.104) (0.106)
Education -0.0593 -0.0344 -0.0571 -0.0322
(0.0931) (0.0918) (0.0933) (0.0943)
Male 0.0353 0.0509 0.0328 0.0301
(0.0914) (0.0904) (0.0916) (0.0926)
Age 0.103*** 0.0796*** 0.0937*** 0.0869***
(0.0303) (0.0306) (0.0309) (0.0310)
Income 0.00479 0.00361 0.00438 0.00427
(0.00358) (0.00354) (0.00358) (0.00354)
Constant -1.629*** -1.316*** -1.606*** -1.212***
(0.201) (0.193) (0.202) (0.216)
Number of Obs. 904 904 904 904
The reported estimates are coefficients of a probit model.
Standard errors in parenthesis. ***(**, *) indicates statistical significance at the
1 (5,10) percent level.
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